

Croatia. This preventive deployment, relying on presence and moral suasion for deterrence, but with the infantry component armed for self-defence, is considered to be one of the more successful aspects of the UN operation in the former Yugoslavia.

Another process under the heading of preventive diplomacy is the creation of *demilitarized zones*. DMZs are not new, of course, but what is novel is the idea of creating them in advance of a potential problem, again with the consent of one or more parties to the dispute. Like "conventional" demilitarized zones, these would require a verification mechanism or mechanisms, for example, regular inspections on the ground, overflight, human and/or electronic surveillance, etc.

The four foregoing examples of preventive diplomacy are more fully described, from a United Nations perspective, in *An Agenda for Peace*, and it is not the intention to dwell on them here, except to discuss possible improvements. Preventive diplomacy is in many ways another term for confidence-building, and the processes described are themselves confidence-building measures.

With respect to early warning, there is room for improvement in the quantity and quality of the information that is or could be made available to decision makers like the Secretary-General. Better advantage can be taken of existing UN and other international agencies, including regional and non-governmental organizations, by establishing formal and informal reporting systems and focal points for the analysis of the information provided. In addition, although the Secretary-General of the United Nations has made the point a number of times, individual states must be constantly encouraged to provide information that comes to their attention by whatever means, including NTM, giving their own analysis where appropriate. In all cases it is essential that the receiving organiza-

tion have its own capacity for analysis to ensure that an independent judgment can be made.

The UN now has two annual reporting instruments which can be improved to give greater transparency and as measures of early warning. The first is a *standardized system of reporting military expenditure*, which has been operating for some 12 years but with only some 30 or so states reporting. There is a need for more "peer pressure" on other states to report in order to improve the value of the exercise. This year's resolution at the General Assembly recognized this requirement, and it called upon all member states to "participate" and sought the views of states "on ways and means to strengthen and broaden participation in. . ."<sup>4</sup> The value of this exercise is probably more psychological than practical, but there is merit in that alone, as it reinforces the concept of transparency in the broad sense. It remains to be seen whether participation will grow and the instrument will be amended to maximize its usefulness. It is of note that the CSCE countries have decided to exchange this information annually on the basis of the UN standardized reporting system. This in itself will increase the number of states reporting, and that growth will it is hoped be replicated in other regional forums.

The second instrument, termed the *Register of Conventional Arms*,<sup>5</sup> came into effect for the calendar year 1992, and calls on states to report the export and import of certain categories of conventional arms. This initiative is off to a successful start with over 80 countries reporting on an estimated 90 per cent of actual transfers worldwide. States were also asked to *voluntarily* provide *supplementary* information, for example, on military holdings, procurement through national production and relevant national policies regarding arms transfers. A good number of states provided this supplementary information, thus auguring well for future development of the Register.

<sup>4</sup> General Assembly Resolution 48/62 of December 16, 1993.

<sup>5</sup> General Assembly Resolution 46/36L of December 9, 1991.

