

Reform perceptions, on the other hand, are less convinced of the persistence of "Atlanticism," and include the United States in the analysis of trends to economic cooperation and foreign policy realism. For the exponent of reform in Soviet domestic and foreign policies, the situation lends itself to increasingly comprehensive stabilization and cooperation in European affairs, based on a growing Soviet-American collaboration. So far as the reform viewpoint is concerned, there is a reasonably good fit between the three broad tendencies presently observed, and those acknowledged by Lenin in 1922. Assuming that the overall situation in which the Soviet Union currently finds itself favours a reform perception of the complex setting to the West, we may proceed to look at the action implications of the Genoa precedent in an effort to predict how Moscow may behave at the CSCE.

In terms of strategy, Soviet policy-makers would envisage a long-term endeavour to attune policy to the task of strengthening the "realist" trend at the expense of "Atlanticism," thereby creating an increasingly secure situation in which trends toward comprehensive East-West economic cooperation could flourish. Acting systematically to reduce the perceived threat of Communist aggression in the West, Moscow would champion reasonable proposals for a durable peace in Europe, while entering into immediate practical agreements