A number of Delegations have spoken convincingly in this respect. They have clearly demonstrated that it is this asymmetry of information on military activities which induces insecurity. Let me repeat an assertion I have made several times before: secrecy is the enemy of confidence.

We must face up to this state of affairs. As one of our colleagues put it so accurately, we must try to demystify the issue of military information. Of course, it can be argued that in the life of any State many areas of military activity constitute a kind of 'holy of holies'. There are aspects which any State does not wish to reveal about its military affairs. We all respect these concerns. But a great deal of military information on force postures and out-of-garrison activities could be made available to other States without threatening anyone's security.

The reluctance to recognize this fact constitutes in my view the basic asymmetry here and it results in a unilateral advantage for one side. The Stockholm Conference presents an opportunity to set this asymmetry right and to change a unilateral advantage to a mutual advantage. If the result of our work were more openness in military affairs, exchanges of information about these matters could become a valuable channel of East-West cooperation. If our efforts are successful, the Stockholm Conference could realize its potential, which we have all recognized: its potential for improving East-West relations and advancing the process of arms control and disarmament."

## *Statement of January 29, 1985, on Non-Use of Force*

"My Delegation welcomes any proposal which would contribute to moving this Conference forward towards its aim of adopting concrete confidence- and security-building measures designed to reduce mistrust and misunderstanding among the participating States. We shall study the proposal just presented by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union in this spirit, and with close attention.

I am bound to observe, however, that initiatives like this one, looking to the working-out of treaties on the non-use of force or non-aggression pacts are familiar. History is replete with examples of proposals for the promotion of peaceful relations among nations by renouncing war as an instrument of national policy. One such agreement was signed, in 1928, by 65 States, many of them represented in this hall. It has never been rescinded and therefore remains in effect even today. What a disappointment the Briand-Kellogg pact has been.

It was motivated by laudable political intent. But it was not backed up by concrete CSBMs nor by means of verification. As a declaration of good intentions, it failed to achieve its aims.

My Delegation has more than once expressed its views on proposals of this nature. They are static obligations which are fully enshrined in the United Nations Charter, and already reaffirmed in the United Nations Declaration on the principles guiding friendly relations among States, and, on a regional European basis, in the Helsinki Final Act.

It is not a restatement or a re-working of the principle of non-use of force that is needed now. What is needed now, as confirmed in the mandate of our Conference, is to give dynamic expression and effect to this principle. We need to reduce the risk of war in Europe by adopting concrete CSBMs which would make military activities more predictable. We need to ensure that a conflict will not break out because of misperception of intentions. This is the purpose of the proposal submitted by Canada and a number of other Delegations over one year ago.

As the Canadian Government has stated in the past, and as my Delegation has reaffirmed here, we are prepared to study proposals of the kind just presented to us. We shall judge its merits from the point of view of what contribution it could make to achieving the aims of this Conference and to promoting the process of verifiable arms control, and strengthening security in Europe."

*Divisional-size movements out-of-garrison would be notified under the NATO and NNA proposals at the Conference.* US DOD