

existence in every member of the State of an individual life and individual powers of thought and action constitutes an essential difference between the body politic and anything to which the term organism can be literally applied. Yet of the two contrasted theories of the social union, that which represents it as a compact, and that which represents it as an organism, while neither is wholly true, there is a good deal more of truth in the second than in the first. But organisms, while they may grow, develop, and, within certain limits, be modified in their growth and development, cannot be fundamentally changed, much less can they be fundamentally changed by any legislation, by anybody's fiat, or even, as the experience of the French Revolution showed, by the guillotine. If Mr. Gronlund were absolute dictator of the human race—and no merely national directorship would suffice for the work of universal regeneration—he would find a repugnancy in human nature which would render all his decrees fruitless. The living clay would refuse to be moulded by the hand of the autocratic potter. As has been said before the defects of the social organism are only the counterparts of those of the individual organism and of everything else in the world in which we live. Are property, as the inducement to productive labour, and capital, as the means of setting labour to work, imperfect contrivances and liable to morbid derangement? So are our organs of respiration, of circulation, of digestion. They have their ailments analagous, say, to excessive stress of competition, or the undue accumulation of capital in particular hands. Nor will laceration and convulsions work any improvement in either case whatever rational treatment may do. Of capital Mr. Gronlund seems to entertain that notion which is formed by looking exclusively at wealthy manufacturers who grind down their workmen. It would be as reasonable to take Nero as the type of government and to identify medical science with poisoning. Let Mr. Gronlund only try, say in a newly discovered island, how much can be done by labour without the aid of "Horseleech" and "Vampire" capital. Farmer A spends all that he earns. Farmer B saves, invests in a Loan Society and furnishes to other farmers the means of taking up and stocking farms, to their own benefit and that of the community, himself receiving the interest which is the price and reward of his thrift. Farmer B, according to Mr. Gronlund, is a Horseleech and a Vampire.

UTILITARIAN ETHICS.*

MR. BEATTIE'S little book may be of use to those who are unfamiliar with ethical speculation, but he might have written a more satisfactory volume had he followed out more persistently the promptings of the purely speculative impulse. The value of a philosophical doctrine must be estimated even more from the spirit in which the enquiry is conducted than from the results arrived at, and it is difficult to avoid the suspicion that the author has sometimes assumed dogmatically a conclusion which he has not taken due pains to verify for himself. Nor does he always state the doctrine of his antagonist with perfect fairness. No utilitarian would admit that the end of action is "self-interest." It may be that the "common good" of the hedonist is reducible to self-interest, but this should not be taken for granted without explanation. Mr. Beattie seems to be most at home in the writings of intentionists and of the older utilitarians. With such writers as Sidgwick, Bradley and Green he does not show any acquaintance, and his classification of the ethical doctrine of Kant as "intentional" betrays an imperfect apprehension of the revolution in ethical as in metaphysical speculation of which that master in philosophy was the leader.

An examination of all the points raised by Mr. Beattie is impossible, but a few words may be said on his views of conscience and freedom of will. Conscience he regards as an "intuitive faculty," whose province is "not to judge but to give us the distinction between right and wrong." Error in "the different decisions which the consciences of different men" yield, is due not to conscience but to understanding. This conclusion does not seem to harmonize with the statement elsewhere made that, from "the moral disorder of our nature" conscience sometimes "fails to secure obedience to the right." But, apart from that discrepancy, the doctrine is demonstrably untenable. A conscience that does not judge no doubt cannot go wrong, but neither can it go right: it is simply impotent, and must *always* "fail to secure obedience to the right." Supplying us merely with the abstract distinction of right and wrong, it is no guide to conduct at all. Suppose the understanding, in Paley's instance, to decide that a son in betraying his father was actuated by a desire for the public good, what "faculty" pronounces the act to be good or bad? Not conscience,

which cannot judge the rightness or wrongness of a particular act; not understanding, which merely decides the matter of fact; what then? There must be some third "faculty," neither conscience nor understanding, which at once supplies the idea of right, to account for which conscience was introduced, and applies it to the case in hand. This "practical reason" forces conscience to occupy a position of *otium sine dignitate*, and the latter becomes a mere *faineant* ruler, presiding over a realm of shadows.

The truth is that Mr. Beattie's analysis of the "soul" is wrong in principle. He speaks of it as parcelled out into lots, each of which is the possession of a separate "faculty." Even common sense, on which in extremity he is disposed to fall back, knows better: it knows that a man is himself, and not a mob of independent powers. Conscience, will, and impulse, are but the single self-conscious or rational subject viewed in different lights. Impulse is the tendency to will different ends, which when realized is the willing of some one end, and conscience is the capacity of judging ends to be good or bad, or the actual judgment that a certain end is good or bad. And as every end is either good or bad there can be no volition that is not capable of being judged by conscience to be good or bad. When once this is apprehended, the problem of freedom admits of easy solution. As a motive is the will in action, and will is just the man determining himself to action, to have a motive and to be free are the same thing. Mr. Beattie thinks that "motive-determination" and "self-determination" are "two doctrines"; in other words, that to be determined by a motive is to be in the chains of necessity; and he tries to escape from the consequences of a false position by drawing an illusory distinction between "metaphysical necessity" and "physiological freedom." He may rest assured that he is caught in a net the meshes of which cannot be broken in that way. His mistake is in assuming with his utilitarian opponents that impulse or desire as a motive is an external influence *impelling* the will to act, whereas it is itself the will or self in action. "Motive-determination" and "self-determination" are, therefore, identical; and it might also be readily shown that a motive and the consequences of an act imply one another, so that a man's moral character must be judged by the tendency of his act to further the perfect life in himself and others, while the moral quality of his act is determined by its relation to the motive, *i.e.*, to the man as willing it. Thus utilitarianism and intuitionism are reconciled in a doctrine which shows that the right is the truly useful, and the truly useful the right. It may be added that such a doctrine will not separate, as Mr. Beattie does, between the Divine "nature" and the Divine "will," but will recognize that they are identical.

JOHN WATSON.

THE RIEL OUTBREAK.

CALGARY, ALBERTA.

THE section of country chosen by Riel for his second rising against the Canadian Government has been selected with a very adequate idea of the kind of warfare he intended to wage. Duck Lake is situated between the North and South Saskatchewan, about six miles from the south branch and twelve miles from the north branch. A trail runs from the south end of Duck Lake, where the rebel quarters now are, to Carlton on the north branch of the Saskatchewan. The country all around is half bush and poplar and half prairie. Prince Albert Settlement begins twenty miles east of Duck Lake, and the town of Prince Albert, containing from 4,000 to 5,000 people, mostly whites and English Half-breeds, lies twenty miles further east still. The whole section is filled with bad Indians and worse Half-breeds. For a guerilla warfare, no part of the territories is equally favourable, and this is what makes it so probable that it will tax the full capabilities of the Dominion to stamp out the revolt.

I here quote an interview with Major Walker, of Calgary, which has been published in the *Calgary Herald*, a paper which seems especially well-informed on everything relating to the present troubles. Major Walker was for four years in charge of the present scene of the rebellion, as an officer of the North-West Mounted Police, three years of which time he was acting Indian Agent to the Indians who are now fighting on the Half-breed side:

The Half-breeds of Duck Lake and St. Laurent first occasioned trouble in 1875. In that year, in June, one of the unfortunate men just killed in the fight at Duck Lake—Alex. Fisher—started from Carlton on a buffalo hunt, before the Indians and Half-breeds were ready. This was contrary to an established custom amongst the plain-hunters, by which no individual or small party should start in advance of the main body lest the buffalo should be scattered and driven back. A captain used to be appointed, who had power to make laws and impose penalties, and a day fixed for the whole settlement to start for the plains and hunt. The penalty for infraction of these rules was confiscation of property. This penalty was imposed on Fisher. Fisher laid information before Hon. Lawrence Clarke, J.P., who reported the matter to Ottawa as a little rebellion, and asked for police protection. Colonel French went up and Gabriel Dumont, the captain of the hunters, who is now one of Riel's leaders, was arrested. This Dumont never forgave. Five years later, when the Sioux went north, Dumont was heard to say that he would help the Crees to drive out the Sioux, or help the Crees and Sioux to drive out the whites. Strangely enough, Major Crozier, who was driven back the other day, was the officer who arrested Dumont in 1875.

Major Walker goes on to say that the treaty with the Duck Lake Indians was made in 1876, but that these Indians always believed they had made a different treaty to any other Indians in the territories, any

* An Examination of the Utilitarian Theory of Morals. By the Rev. T. R. Beattie, M.A., B.D., Ph.D., Examiner in Knox College and in the University of Toronto. Brantford: T. and T. Sutherland, 1885.