

being experienced or by observing their effects, but perceived to have such a general resemblance as properly to be referred to one class. These they have classified in what seemed to them a convenient manner with a view to considering their influences on our condition, and their moral qualities. Others have endeavoured by analysis to lessen the number of primary passions or emotions, shewing how different names really express the same emotion excited under somewhat different circumstances. With these I agree so entirely that I would carry out their principle to the utmost by admitting only an emotion belonging to pleasure and one belonging to pain, and defining all the others by naming one of these, and pointing to the kind of objects or the condition of things around us in which the peculiar form appears. Such analytical view of the nature and relations of the various emotions would form no unimportant part of a treatise on this branch of the philosophy of mind, but need not be examined in detail in the present connection. There is a very general agreement among philosophers that emotions, passions, or active powers differ essentially in nature from intellectual states, and are felt to have something common to them all as a class, in whatever degree they may differ from each other. This is not indeed a universal sentiment, for both Hartley and James Mill suppose that by due regard to the character of our sensations as pleasurable and painful, and a proper application of the law of association, all the varieties of emotions may be fully explained. I cannot help thinking, however, that the general feeling of those who reflect on the subject is that there is a real well marked difference between intellectual states and emotions, and fully admitting that this difference depends on pleasure and pain as actual sensations, or as ideas intermingling with sensations, I think it desirable, if possible, to ascertain the exact nature and causes of the phenomena. All sensations are commonly said to be pleasurable, painful, or indifferent. The truth seems to be, that every sensation, if not too intense—in which case it becomes painful—is naturally, before it has been affected by frequent repetition, a source of pleasure. Those which we describe as indifferent are such as we have frequent occasion to experience, which causes them to be familiar, and as are not now impressed with any peculiar vividness. The sensation which causes pleasure is either novel or unusually vivid, and if its vividness be in excess it becomes a pain. Thus pleasures repeated become indifferent, scarcely receiving from the mind any notice,