at the legal 2. C. 7. as RESISTIBLE:

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ower of difry able opiliament and and Colonies ands, Slaves they pafs by an Inteftaon to anfwer

property, I tion of Troof his value, of, and was the Sheriff, 5. Geo. 2, C. belonging to ion of Trefn? Or, that efendant, or ng of a Slave, nder fuch an vs. Snow, 2 Saund Saund. 47.—See alfo 2. Ld. Ray. 1073, and Gilbert's Exec. 15.

A fpecial action of the Cafe, which might perhaps have been maintained for detaining the Slave per quod Servitium amisit, would have been founded upon the idea, that the Plaintiff was only intitled to his fervices. But in truth it appears, that he was intitled to fome thing more, namely, to the property in him and right of disposing of him. And, upon that ground, I think an action of Trover was the proper form of action. And, indeed, a fpecial action on the Cafe would not, in the Cafe of, an actual conversion, be an adequate remedy; as the damages, in that Cafe, would not arife from the detention of the Slave.—The Cafe referred to in 2. Salk.' 666, and 2. Ld. Ray. 1274, is not, I think, applicable to the prefent question, for the reasons stated in Mr. Aplin's opinion.

THE only doubt feems to be, whether there was a proper demand and refufal of the Slave, previous to the commencement of the action? Or, whether the Evidence flated was fufficient to authorize the Jury in finding a conversion ?—But, as they have found it, that confideration cannot be material on a motion in arreft of judgment.

The Opinion of Mr. PERCIVAL.

I AM of opinion, that an action of Trover was the proper action for Mr. Delancy to recover the value of his Negro Slave. I concur fo *intirely* with Mr. Aplin, in the very able opinion which he has given upon the fubject, that I cannot do better than generally refer to his reation i.g.—It appears to me, that the legal inference which he draws from 5. Geo. 2. C. 7. as applicable to this queition, is QUITE IRRESISTIBLE and UNAN-SWERABLE.