his return, and said that the information was laid under the "Consolidated Orders respecting Censorship" passed on the 17th January, 1917, and the 22nd May, 1918. The Orders of the latter date only were in force: see the volume of Dominion statutes for 1919, p. lxvi. Order II., sec. 2, provides "that no person shall, unless with lawful excuse or authority, the proof of which shall be on him . . . receive or have in his possession or on premises in his occupation or under his control . . . any newspaper, tract, periodical, book circular, or other printed publication . . . containing objectionable matter." "Objectionable matter" is minutely defined in 15 paragraphs of Order I. By sec. 5 of Order II., the Secretary of State, "may by warrant under his hand prohibit the possession within Canada of any newspaper," etc., as above; and sub-sec. 2 of sec. 5 provides: "From and after publication by the Secretary of State . . . in the Canada Gazette of a notice of the issue of such warrant and of its terms conformably to such notice, every number, issue, or copy of such newspaper, tract, periodical, book, circular, or other printed matter so prohibited shall for all purposes and by all courts and authorities be conclusively deemed to contain objectionable matter." On any prosecution under these Orders, the following rule applies (sec. 7): "In any prosecution or proceeding brought, had, or taken under this Order by or on behalf or by the direction or under the authority of the Attorney-General of Canada, all matters alleged in the information, charge, or indictment shall be without proof rebuttably be presumed to be true."

Under Order III., any offence against these Orders is deemed to have been committed either at the place where it was actually committed or at any place where the offender may be.

What was said in the Zura case, ante 224, applies equally in this case. The possession of certain publications may be prohibited by the Secretary of State. The Canada Gazette proves this prohibition regarding those produced. The information is good and sufficiently describes the offence; and the conviction, either as amended or in its original form, is not improper.

The learned Judge was satisfied in this case, as he was in the Zura case, that the defendant pleaded "guilty" with full knowledge of what he was charged with; and the magistrate's certificate should be accepted in both cases as conclusive. Reference on this point to Rex v. Dagenais (1911), 23 O.L.R. 667, 18 Can. Crim. Cas. 287; Rex v. Barlow (1918), 1 W.W.R. 499.

Motion dismissed with costs.