

3. Whatever you may think of these hypothetical examples, you will agree, I imagine, that, unless action is taken in advance, it will be difficult to draw a clear line between the Korean operations and operations in defence of Formosa. Moreover, the Government of Nationalist China will have a vested interest in blurring the distinction. We have therefore been wondering whether it would not be wise for the Security Council to include in the resolution that is to be passed tomorrow a territorial demarcation of the area around Korea in which United States forces and the forces of other members of the United Nations will be acting under United Nations auspices.

4. The difficulties of such a demarcation, of course, would be considerable. We are inclined to think here, however, that they would not be insuperable. The kind of territorial delimitation that we are thinking of would mark out an area which might run as far north as the 40th parallel, as far south as the 32nd parallel, and which might be bounded on the west by a line running midway down Korea Bay and the Yellow Sea. In our view, there would be no need for the eastern boundary of the area to be drawn so closely to Korea. It might even extend far enough to the east to include MacArthur's headquarters. The important point would be to exclude the whole of Communist China from the area in which operations under the United Nations would be undertaken.

5. Such a territorial delimitation, we think, would have the advantage not only of lessening the danger of members of the United Nations becoming involved in incidents with Chinese forces outside Korea, but also of establishing a framework in which the conflict in Korea might be localized. If we understand United States policy in this general area correctly, they are anxious to localize and isolate the fighting in Korea and also to sterilize the conflict between Chiang Kai-Shek and Peking. Such a plan as we are thinking of would thus seem to be in accordance with their approach. We are therefore wondering whether it might not prove attractive to them and whether they might not be willing to sponsor in the Security Council such a territorial delimitation of the area round Korea in which forces would be acting under the aegis of the United Nations.

6. I should be grateful to have, as quickly as possible, your reactions to this proposal. Ends.

38.

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*L'ambassadeur aux États-Unis
au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Ambassador in United States
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM WA-1492

Washington, July 6, 1950

SECRET. MOST IMMEDIATE.

Repeat Permdel No. 47.

Following for Heeny from Wrong, Begins: Your EX-1081 of July 6th. Korea.