

ment to those kinds of sufferings, that are common to virtuous and vicious actions, and that therefore belong to the actions as actions, and not to the virtue or the vice of them.

It is deeply to be regretted that Butler, in his celebrated "Analogy," sometimes made use of expressions that seem chargeable with this want of discrimination, and with the assumption of the opinion referred to. He soon found, however, that, on this ground, he could not prove "the beginning of a righteous administration." And though he did not wholly and steadily renounce it, he was constrained to take other ground, and to distinguish between "actions themselves, and that quality of them called virtuous or vicious." And practically, though not so expressly, to make a corresponding distinction, between those pleasures and pains that are immediately produced by our own act, and those pleasures and pains that are remotely consequent, and are caused by the agency of others under whose power and government we are. The following quotation shows that he regards the remote consequences as the proper proofs: "Indeed when one has been recollecting the proper proofs of a future state of rewards and punishments, nothing, methinks, can give us so sensible an apprehension of the latter, or representation of it to the mind, as observing, that after the chief bad consequences, temporal consequences, of their follies have been delayed for a great while, at length they break in irresistibly, like an armed force."

By examining instances of this kind, he finds that vice is sometimes, and virtue never, punished as such; that virtue is sometimes, and vice never, rewarded as such. And, therefore, by means of these cases, "the beginnings of a righteous administration may, beyond all question, be found in nature."

Now, if the examination of those remotely consequent pleasures and pains, furnishes proofs of "the beginnings of a righteous administration," then it was not necessary for this object, to assume that every pleasure and pain, the concomitant, as well as the consequent, is a reward, or a punishment. It was not only not necessary, it was unwise. To class all pleasures indiscriminately under the head of rewards, and all pains indiscriminately under the head of punishments, would be to prove, not a righteous, but an unrighteous, administration of moral government, as has been already stated.

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