

others may be good or bad, not because it forces the individual to act in a certain way, but because the ideal of self cannot be realized by the individual apart, but only through the development of the ideal in society. Kant's fundamental mistake is to view the natural desires as belonging to the individual sensibility which may be acted upon from without. Every natural desire being, on his view, a susceptibility of the individual to be affected by what is external to him, he assumes that to speak of the influence of society is the same thing as to speak of the influence of natural desire as understood in this unspiritual way.

It is only another form of the same imperfection that Kant allows of no distinction between morality and religion. Morality is a purely individual matter, and therefore man cannot be aided in his moral life by God any more than by others, or at least only by God, in so far as he himself wills the law of his own reason. Now, if we thus conceive of God as necessarily withdrawn from the inner life of man, we fall back upon a self-determination which is purely individual. The moral law thus becomes a law only for the individual. Man cannot, indeed, being what he is, rid himself of its authority; but, after all, the goal of his efforts may be only the realization of an ideal that does not harmonize with the true nature of things. What he supposes to be moral progress may, from the point of view of God, be moral retrogression. Thus that which constitutes the essential feature in the religious consciousness is lost, or at least becomes problematic. The essence of the religious consciousness is the assurance that in realizing the higher life man is a fellow-worker with God, and that in so realizing himself all things work