

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

Tuesday, February 18, 1969.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, we have with us this morning, Professor Kenneth McNaught. A detailed biographical sketch of Professor McNaught and his qualifications has been distributed to members of the Committee. Professor McNaught tells me that he will not be available this afternoon, so we should try to plan on completing our questioning this morning.

Without going into further detail as to his qualifications which are very impressive indeed, I will simply introduce Professor McNaught to you. I might also mention that a summary of his evidence has been distributed to members of the Committee. If anyone does not have copies, the Clerk has additional copies here.

I will call upon Professor McNaught who will summarize the statement that has already been distributed to members of the Committee.

Professor Kenneth McNaught (Department of History, University of Toronto): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Most of you have copies of this and perhaps some of you have even had time to read it. So I will summarize and perhaps read what I think are particularly, from my point of view at any rate, pertinent parts of the argument.

My essential case is that I think it is very important for Canada to develop a policy of non-alignment, and that to do so requires withdrawal from the military alliance system composed essentially of NATO, NORAD, the defence production sharing agreements, and the permanent committee on defence in North America.

At the beginning I argue that one of the principal points put forward by supporters of non-alignment has been that our alliance membership has prevented us from taking such useful initiatives as the recognition of the Chinese Government. I suggest that it might be argued that the fact that we are now apparently engaged in preliminary talks in Stockholm, looking toward the recognition of China, that this may be a counter-argument and may suggest that, in fact, our military alliance commitments have not been as restrictive as some of us argue. So I would like to read this paragraph as part of the argument:

What, then, is the context of our decision to negotiate the recognition of China? We do so in the environment created by acute political crisis in the United States. That crisis resulted directly from the insistent need to end the war in Vietnam. And any permanent settlement in Southeast Asia can scarcely be arranged if the United States continues its demand to maintain the faltering diplomatic ostracism of China. Thus, while Mr. McCloskey clucks disapprovingly in Washington, no one . . .

perhaps I should say nearly no one

. . . in Ottawa takes this as a serious signal to stop the play. Perhaps, but not necessarily, it would be too much to speculate that we had been quietly invited to make our move now. But certainly it would be too much to suggest that the move was a bold assertion of independence and proved that alliance membership does not inhibit us from pursuing policies strongly disapproved by the senior member.

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And I go on then to argue that that move toward the recognition of China came very belatedly and that we are still inhibited, along all the other lines about non-alignment, from taking what I consider to be proper initiatives. Furthermore, we are, by the military alliance system, necessarily directly associated with some of the most disagreeable actions going on in the world, and I want to read a paragraph on that.

From Greek repression to Portuguese imperialism to American slaughter in Vietnam—we are directly tied by the alliance system. Equally, by that system, we have prevented ourselves from exercising a freedom of action at the United Nations and on other fronts that might well have contributed to a reduction of international tensions.

And I argue that in fact we cannot effectively and convincingly support a non-proliferation nuclear treaty while we, ourselves, argue that we are protected by the largest nuclear power in the world. We can hardly tell Egypt or Israel or Pakistan not to