

military subjects should be discussed in the negotiations. The Soviet Union only decided that the prisoner-of-war item of the armistice agenda should be mixed up with a political conference after it became apparent that the North Korean and Chinese negotiators would not be able to gain the principle of forcible return of those prisoners not wishing to exercise their right to repatriation.

In the last speech, we have heard four references to a cease-fire. A cease-fire is a serious matter. It is not a fit subject for a glib trick of the tongue, such as Mr. Vyshinsky's advice when he said the other day that "whoever wants peace, it is easy, let him put up his hand". I did not see my neighbour to the left following this exhortation, nor did I see the representatives of Poland or Czechoslovakia immediately and obediently raise their hands. Even they could not be hypnotized into such an action, and the Soviet Union representative is always trying out his hypnotic skill. He reminds one of the magician in the old Asian fable who owned a lot of sheep but was too parsimonious to employ shepherds or pen his sheep in. Instead, he would hypnotize the sheep and suggest to them that in fact he knew what was best for them and they should merely seek to trust him. They should not run away because it would actually be quite pleasant to have their throats cut and their skins removed. The magician had no trouble at all with his sheep, which quite eagerly awaited the opportunity to provide him with meat and wool.

"Stop the fighting and leave the details to a political commission", cries the representative of the Soviet Union. The prisoners-of-war, of course, are just a detail. They do not matter. They can wait as hostages while the Communists' side, fortuitously relieved of military pressure, bargains for the concessions it wants, secure in the knowledge that the commission can take no decision without its consent. And if we are not beguiled by this deception, we are rejecting a cease-fire. So you would think, at least, if you should be hypnotized by the magician.

Of course, it was advantageous for the Soviet Union representative to advocate a simple cessation of fighting earlier in the war when so much of the territory of the Korean Republic was in Communist hands. The Communists have not, however, at all times been advocates of a simple immediate cease-fire, as Mr. Vyshinsky in reality is not now. I made reference last November to the proposals put forward in January 1951 by the cease-fire group of the General Assembly. What the cease-fire group called for in effect was the immediate cessation of hostilities with other matters to be discussed subsequently.

As a reply, the Chinese Foreign Minister sent a communication to the First Committee of the General Assembly on January 17 stating that political conditions -- such as the withdrawal of United States forces from Formosa and the seating of Peking representatives in the United Nations -- must be precedent to any settlement in Korea. Mr. Chou En-lai observed that the principle of cease-fire first and negotiations afterwards "could lead to genuine peace" and that the Central People's