

Here we must say quite firmly: In verification, no excess is too much. And this is more than just a political statement. If we intend to continue moving as we have been doing until now, reducing troops and weapons, dismantling huge structures of military confrontation, adopting defensive doctrines and limiting military capabilities to levels of minimum sufficiency for defense, then we need an even more effective and multi-optional system of verification having a great margin of dependability.

I would even venture to propose this formula: sufficiency in weapons and redundancy as regards verification capabilities.

This formula is prompted not least by the trends and prospects of the current European situation. Before our eyes a new Europe is emerging, which no longer consists of three or four groups of states but rather is a space with a vastly different, more complex political configuration. To our regret, few would vouch today that this new configuration would not create new problems, cause new complications in various places, or open old wounds or scars.

In this situation the Open Skies regime could become an essential and effective way of maintaining and building confidence and removing the suspicions and apprehensions that might arise.

As you probably know, as soon the President of the United States Mr. George Bush suggested the idea of Open Skies, we immediately called for more than that, i.e. for extending the area of international glasnost and openness.

Of course, monitoring the Earth from above, we can get some idea of the movements of Navy ships and submarines. But can this be sufficient today when nuclear weapons, long-range cruise missiles, aircraft and combat helicopters are moving from land to the seas and oceans?

And yet, again and again at various negotiations the issue of naval arms and confidence-building measures affecting the activities of states on the seas and oceans is being left out of consideration and without resolution.

No serious argument is cited to justify this. It is just claimed that it is technically difficult to verify anything on ships and submarines. So an inspection team may visit a missile factory or a nuclear base but never a ship. Why? Because, we are told, naval commanders are born with a pathological dislike of inspections. But then, do ICBM commanders madly love inspections?