

1950s relatively ineffective.<sup>151</sup> Gurtov and Hwang also studied Chinese threats and use of force but focussed on the interplay between security and domestic policy. Basing their analysis on five case studies spanning the period from the Chinese intervention in Korea in 1950 to the Sino-Soviet border clashes of 1969, they found Chinese leaders most willing to consider the use of force when they perceived the domestic costs of a foreign policy defeat to be extremely high. In these circumstances, deterrence, even when practised against China by a superior military power, was likely to fail.<sup>152</sup>

To the extent that these studies lend support to the contention that previous deterrence encounters influence the subsequent practice of deterrence, the frequency of challenges, and their outcome, they present a problem for analysis based on the aggregation of data across cases. Statistical inference generally requires the independence of cases. If the existence or outcome of one deterrence encounter influences the probability or outcome of another, the assumption of independence is violated.<sup>153</sup> Moreover, statistical analysis based on cross-case analysis is unlikely to capture these kinds of effects over time. Time series analysis, which can build in the lagged impact of variables over time, is likely to be a more valid methodological approach.

A second and equally important research question is the relationship between immediate and general deterrence. Immediate deterrence may be described as the tip of the deterrence iceberg. It is important to analyze the complex links between immediate and general deterrence and the ways in which the practice of one affect the course and outcome of the other. We attempt to address some of these

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<sup>151</sup> Allen S. Whiting, *The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1975); Steve Chan, "Chinese Conflict Calculus and Behavior: Assessment from a Perspective of Conflict Management," *World Politics* 30 (April 1978), pp.391-410, agrees with Whiting that in both the Korean and Sino-Indian disputes Peking failed to give sufficient lead time to its adversaries to reconsider their policies.

<sup>152</sup> Gurtov and Hwang, *China Under Threat*.

<sup>153</sup> This problem has been pointed out by Levy, "Quantitative Studies of Military Threat and Response," p.19, in his review of the research of Huth and Russett.