

more general question of peacekeeping and international security. If one of the objectives of this session was to define the problems and the positions held here, then it has had a measure of success. But to the extent this objective has been reached, we can only concur with the remark of the Chairman of the Committee that the report reflects the deep divisions which had already been seen at the 31st and 32nd sessions of the General Assembly. We can therefore wonder how the discussion can proceed beyond the general debate stage, given the lack of agreement on the broad outlines of the Special Committee's future work.

Mr. Chairman, my delegation cannot share the opinion of those who would like to reduce the mandate of the Special Committee to the task of formulating a draft treaty on the non-use of force. We also doubt the wisdom of considering the separation of the question of peaceful settlement of disputes and other questions related to the non-use of force. Many very interesting ideas have been submitted to the Committee, dealing in particular with the strengthening of the Security Council's powers, Chapter VII of the Charter, the role of the Secretary-General, the possibility of establishing international inquiry machinery and the importance of the role of the International Court of Justice. If the mandate of the Committee is extended, such ideas will have to be developed further and put into the form of proposals in working documents.

It appears to us that the Soviet Delegation has based its presentation of its draft treaty on two premises. The first is that such a treaty would ensure the future respect of the principle of the non-use of force. The second is that the draft treaty would have no negative impact on the United Nations Charter. I must say that this session of the Special Committee has not convinced us of the validity of these two premises.

With regard to the possible positive impact of the treaty, it seems clear to us that its provisions are really too general to have any appreciable, practical effect. It cannot be said too often that prohibition of the use of force is virtually universally accepted, and that the addition to this principle of a few articles which have no concrete applicative measures will not settle those cases wherein some states feel obliged to resort to force despite the prohibition. My delegation has frequently heard the list of the beneficial effects of a treaty on the non-use of force: from disarmament to economic, social and technical progress. But what is missing from this description, Mr. Chairman, is the relationship of cause and effect. It is not sufficient to say, for example, that one result of the treaty would be the facilitation of settlement of conflicts. We would like to hear how the treaty, without any measures aimed at reducing the causes of tension, could have any greater effect than the general obligations already accepted. We are not denying that rules of law are binding in nature but wondering whether such a concise treaty, which could be contravened in the absence of application measures, might not weaken the force of the rules contained therein. My delegation would like to have clarifications on this matter.