

tary establishments and facilitate the unrestricted aerial photographing of those establishments to demonstrate that no surprise attack was being contemplated. This proposal was later linked with the Soviet proposal for ground control posts in the March 22, 1956 Statement by U.S. Representative Stassen. That led to the United States co-sponsoring a resolution, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, calling for the adoption of "confidence-building measures" incorporating these ideas. This is probably the first use of the term.

22. The 1958 Geneva Surprise Attack Conference

The conference demonstrated the contrasting types of "surprise" that dominated the thinking of the United States (strategic nuclear) and the Soviet Union (European conventional). The conference is noteworthy for the schemes advanced by both the Soviet and the American teams of experts. The American proposals for dealing with (strategic nuclear) surprise attack included inspection posts to monitor facilities where surprise-attack preparation could occur. These were to be supplemented by mobile inspection teams free to examine suspicious activities at both airfields and missile bases. The Soviet proposals also included static ground observation posts (88 in total) and aerial inspection, but within a zone of 800 kilometres on either side of the inter-German border. The Soviets also proposed reductions of up to one third in conventional force strength and a ban on nuclear weapons within the region. Finally, the Soviets were very interested in reaching some sort of political accommodation that would properly define the context of East-West security concerns in Europe. The United States adopted a strictly non-political approach focusing on technical details. In many ways, this remains the archetype of Soviet and American approaches to most arms control issues.

23. The 1958 Rapacki Plan

The Polish Foreign Minister outlined a proposal on November 4, 1958 that called for a Central European nuclear-free zone after existing nuclear forces in the region had been "frozen". The creation of a nuclear-free zone was to be accompanied by mutual conventional force reductions. A more elaborate and formal version was presented on March 28, 1962.

24. The 1959 Antarctic Treaty

This treaty explicitly demilitarized the Antarctic mass. Article I prohibits "any measures of a military nature, such as the establishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military manoeuvres, as well as the testing of any type of weapons." Article VII declares all facilities open to inspection and requires notification of any introduction of personnel or equipment into the region.

25. The 1963 Memorandum of Understanding between the USA and the USSR regarding the Establishment of a Direct Communication Link

The United States and the Soviet Union, in this memorandum of understanding and its annex, agreed to establish and share jointly in the costs of running a direct telecommunications link (via Helsinki and London) between their capitals. This is a classic CBM measure.

26. The 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water

This was a very important treaty, banning Soviet, American and British nuclear tests in all media but underground. The three parties also undertook to negotiate a complete test ban that would include underground explosions. It is said to have had a major impact in demonstrating a willingness to control the nuclear competition between the United States and the Soviet Union.

