

The *Toronto Globe* treats us to the following:—

"Above all things let there be no attempt made to settle this trivial matter by a solemn arbitration. There is a great deal that is absurd in two independent sovereign Powers referring matters in dispute between them to arbitration at any time, seeing that without going to war the losing party cannot be compelled to abide by the award, and it is never cordially acquiesced in by both. There will be a rankling sense of injury in any event, and this may as well be left to flow from the first misunderstanding as from some subsequent one. Canadians never took kindly to the loss of San Juan, any more than the British did to the payment of the 'Alabama' indemnity, or the people of the United States to the Halifax award. If we must have a standing quarrel with our neighbours—and it is none of our seeking—by all means let us have the Fortune Bay embroglio rather than a grievance created by some settlement over which we have no control, but which nevertheless leaves us, as the Washington Treaty did, shorn of part our autonomy. Territorial rights are not matters to be trifled with, and we are not afraid but that if left to deal with our neighbours about this or any other international matter we will manage in some way to hold our own. By all means adhere to Lord Salisbury's position, and take the chances."

Whoever penned the above paragraph ought surely to be punished for the lucubration. The absurdity of the statement that "there is a great deal that is absurd in two independent sovereign Powers referring matters in dispute between them to arbitration at any time, seeing that without going to war the losing party cannot be compelled to abide by the award," is merely to state a boy's opinion that "heads I win, tails you lose." If two Powers submit a question to arbitration, it is usually the custom for them to submit to the judgment, the scribbler in the *Globe* to the contrary notwithstanding. The idea that there will be a rankling sense of injury in any event is disproved by the Geneva Award, which was paid by the British Government without quibble or questioning. The system of arbitration relies upon the honour of the contracting parties, and if those signing are not prepared to submit to the arbitration, the sooner the system is abolished the better. It is much better that annoying trifles should be left to arbitration than that they should be allowed to remain unsettled, or that they should furnish an excuse for resorting to arms.

*Truth* says:—

"Mr. Gladstone's illness was deeply deplored in Ireland. I am assured by Irishmen that he has attained a degree of popularity in that country never before reached by any English statesman, and it may be added never so strongly deserved. The Celt is not incapable of appreciating his Saxon ruler when he is given the chance."

*The World* says:—

"It was once the proud boast of this nation that Englishmen did not know when they were beaten. Of late, unhappily, we have had but too good reason to know it, and so has everybody else. Past centuries of glory have been in great danger of eclipse by the military disasters of the last few years. The Crimean fiasco was not exactly complimentary to our national pride; but there, at least, incompetence of leaders and errors chiefly administrative were more than compensated for by the victory which uniformly waited upon our arms. No such consolation is to be found in our most recent military misfortunes. The defeats endured have been humiliating and unmistakable; the losses terrible, with no ray of light to lessen the blackness of disaster. With the memory of Isandlwana still painfully fresh in our minds, we are now startled with a second overthrow, seemingly as gratuitous, and certainly not less complete. Although it may not be easy as yet to draw any close comparison between the two, the salient features of both were much the same. In both the defeat was signal and decisive. In neither can the generals be exonerated from blame. In the one case, Lord Chelmsford, whose personal responsibility cannot now be repudiated, carelessly left his camp, with all its precious contents, unfortified and insufficiently guarded, an easy prey to surprise; in the other, General Burrows was first drawn out from a strong position, then, forced to give battle at a disadvantage, and at length driven ignominiously from the field. The massacre at Isandlwana was not more sanguinary than the rout at Khusk-i-Nakhud was signal. Colours lost, guns abandoned, the wounded left where they lay, the shattered remnant with difficulty withdrawn, to suffer agonies of thirst in their precipitate retreat,—no gloomier picture than this will be found in our military annals, and for these horrors General Burrows must primarily be held to account.

"Although the full measure of this luckless commander's incapacity cannot be accurately determined until the detailed despatches come to hand, there is, upon the face of it, sufficient proof in what we know to show that, in at least one particular he signally failed. It is quite certain that he allowed himself to be out-generalled and out-numbered at the decisive point. Now, the

plea of superior numbers may be accepted in favour of fighting men, but never for the general who is in supreme command. To bring a greater force to crush a smaller is a fundamental rule in war, and he who neglects it or allows his enemy to use it against him is but a poor proficient in his art. Whether this first grave error sums up the whole of General Burrows' shortcomings, time alone can show. It has been said by one of the greatest soldiers of modern times that he is the best general who makes the fewest mistakes. War is a great game of chance and skill combined, played closely by either side with many strange rubs and unforeseen risks to complicate its issues and render its result uncertain in the extreme. It is just possible, but hardly probable, that General Burrows may yet be able to satisfy his critics that he was guilty of nothing worse than the crime of allowing himself to be deceived. It may yet appear from the narrative of events as they occurred on that ill-fated day that he did his best; that he handled his mixed force, his scanty artillery, his untrustworthy cavalry, his single white battalion, and his unsteady native infantry, with commendable but wasted skill; that when fortune went against him, he manœuvred so as to retire in good order, and would have perhaps saved his force had not a great portion of it already taken to their heels. But even if all this were conceded, much more would remain to be said. The partial rehabilitation of General Burrows will not dispose of the business. There are many others whose conduct will not escape inquiry and possible reproof. First and foremost must those be taken to task who entrusted a brigade command to an untried man; for it is now generally admitted that General Burrows had had no experience in active warfare; that he had never led any considerable body of troops in the field or out of it; that he had been for years and years employed solely in sedentary staff employment; and that already the enervating effects of a long residence in Bombay had sapped his energy, and presumably unfitted him for the labours and hardships of a toilsome campaign. It will be incumbent upon General Primrose, again, to explain why he detached so large a force to such a distance from Candahar, retaining no communication with it apparently, whether heliographic or by electric wire, and with no very obvious duties to perform. If Burrows was intended to act as a look-out upon the movements of Ayoub Khan, his defeat at the hands of the latter plainly shows how lamely he sought to carry his instructions into effect. And this at once implicates the 'politicals' of the force. In Colonel St. John, the Governor-General's agent and real custodian of power, would have centred the vitally important duty of obtaining intelligence, and this could have been but very indifferently performed. It is possible, moreover, that Colonel St. John may have hampered and harassed the military chief with civil and political considerations, and that General Burrows, when once committed to fight, was only too eager to prove what he could do.

"Were it not for the uncertainty which still surrounds our operations in Afghanistan, in regard to Roberts' rash march no less than the precarious condition of Candahar, we might take heart of grace in spite of what has occurred. Later news rather diminishes the disgrace which at first seemed overwhelming, while we may yet pluck some advantage even from the bitterness of defeat. The fact is it brings matters to a crisis in Indian military affairs. The time has come for general reconstruction and reorganization of the local army. In two of the Presidencies at least the native forces should be reconstituted on an entirely new basis; everywhere there is room for energetic action and well-considered reform. Supineness, narrow views, weakness of will, have too long prevailed in those high quarters where change should originate; and the occasion peremptorily demands the despatch to India of a strong man as Commander-in-Chief. Who this man should be it is hardly necessary to say. In our self-imposed poverty of military talent we so constantly reiterated one name that it would be futile to suggest that any other general but Sir Garnet Wolseley is equal to the task. Rumour, indeed, reports that he is not at this moment in high favour with the powers that be. But he still reigns paramount in popular esteem; and if public opinion is agreed that Sir Garnet should go to India, go he assuredly will. For ourselves, while studiously deprecating the idea that he is our only general or even a great man, we have never hesitated to recognise Sir Garnet's gifts. He has the rare faculty of command; plenty of brains; no little force of will. Above all he is a good clean workman, and has carried through everything with which he has been intrusted thoroughly and well. The task before him in India would probably greatly tax his powers. He might not achieve complete success; but there would be undoubted benefit from the intervention of a master-spirit, who would make his influence everywhere felt, and rule the whole service with a strong firm hand."

Cardinal Manning, who has 2,800 orphans under his care, is making arrangements with Canadian Roman Catholic bishops to obtain situations for these waifs in families in this country. This is a much better plan than the one usually followed, of sending them out here with nothing in view, and merely trusting to luck to secure homes for these children and even older persons. We learn that there are numerous applications for them, and that a number of them will soon leave for this country.