

physical part of it, as if hoping thus to conceal his extensive obligations to this great philosopher, or rather perhaps to avoid the imputation of any connection with a system unpopular in his country, and long denounced in the scene of his public teaching. I know of no ground for preferring the term *suggestion*, employed by Brown to *association*, the older name; the distinction between *simple* and *relative* suggestion does not appear to be founded on any essential difference or to be practically useful, and the laws of suggestion were soon shown to be reducible to much greater simplicity. Yet Dr. Brown appreciated and exhibited in a peculiarly pleasing manner some great truths, and displayed a power of thought joined with ingenuity and sagacity which command admiration. He has fallen under the imputation of inclination towards Sensationalism, and he is one whose aid, as far as it goes, any party might be proud of. Not to dwell on writers of secondary importance, we come next to JAMES MILL, one of the clearest of writers and closest of reasoners. He put aside, as not immediately needed, all inquiry respecting the physical cause of sensations and their physical relations with ideas, in which respect his judgment may be called in question; but beginning where he did, his work is a noble contribution to philosophy. He fully adopts the Hartleyan doctrine of association, and by simple and well chosen terminology, clearness of style, vividness of illustration, and a lucid order in his thoughts he has rendered the theory intelligible and interesting, whilst his admirable original views respecting language, and his beautiful analysis of some of the most complex ideas conveyed by it have thrown a new and bright light on the whole subject. I cannot feel satisfied with his account any more than with Hartley's, of the emotional part of our nature, to explain which, something more than he admits seems to be required, and I have a method of my own for endeavouring to complete in this respect the theory of the mind, but Mr. Mill's work seems to me, entitled to a place among the finest that have been produced on the philosophy of mind, and deserving of far more attention than has yet been bestowed upon it.

I need not here dwell on the abuses of sensationalism in France, or on the peculiar forms which it assumed in the hands of Helvetius, Condillac, Cabanis, and De Stutt de Tracey; the last mentioned beyond comparison, the best French writer of this school. I cannot but think the phraseology of Condillac more objectionable than what I take to be his real meaning. The *Ideologie* of De Stutt de Tracey, is both in-