

to afford themselves an opportunity of witnessing what was in reality a comprehensive scheme, initiated two years ago, for testing the powers of defence at various coaling stations all over the world. It was inherent in such a plan that the Canada Militia should be invited to assist, and, as the space at our command forbids our entering into minute details, we mention here the fact that, but for one of those errors common enough in telephoning, our good Militia (which furnished nearly half the defending force, and were very well handled by their own officers) would have found themselves committed to as sanguinary an action as they could possibly have desired.

In a first trial of operations combining Regulars and Volunteers, it is not surprising that an oversight or two should happen, but such oversights rarely recur. The harbor transport was fairly sufficient, but was susceptible of a better organization in advance. The D. A. G. of Militia offered to arrange the necessary transport for his own force, and it was a mistake on the part of the Assistant Adjt. General of the Imperial forces not to take advantage of the offer. It would have relieved the latter officer, and have thrown that duty for his own men on the hands of a commander thoroughly acquainted with the means of conveyance in the two provinces under his orders. Another mistake was the omission to assign to Col. Worsley an umpireship or a distinct command. No one, however, least of all Col. Worsley, is disposed to be captious as to such an oversight, and the prompter of a complaint which appeared in one of the newspapers about water-bottles, probably does not know that the D. A. G. has been one of the most persistent officers on the staff in his efforts to have equipments placed on the serviceable footing they ought to be.

As regards the operations themselves, one of them was directed to ascertain the probabilities of preventing the water supply of Halifax from being cut off by a landing at Herring Cove, and there were circumstances in the strategy pursued which showed that in real warfare the invading force would have had an exceedingly tough time of it—in fact could not have effected their landing. A calm day is of course favorable to a landing from boats. Had it been rough their difficulties would have been tenfold multiplied.

Another problem was whether a sufficient force could be sent quickly enough to Fort Clarence to prevent the shelling of the Dockyard by an enemy who should have effected a landing at Cow Bay. This was solved satisfactorily for the defence.

An occupation of McNab's Island, unless supported by a very strong naval force, is not of vital importance. It has even been called a "sepulchre" for invaders, being commanded by all the adjacent forts. The defence may be said to have been on the whole successful, and our own militia contributed to the success in no small degree. One axiom to be gathered from the operations is that no landing should be allowed to take place without an efficient check on the spot. The moment of disembarkation from boats, like the debouchement of troops through a defile or over a bridge, is the moment to seize for a vigorous defence, which may often, at least with land forces, develop into a counter attack. If James the Fourth had not, either from bad generalship or a mistaken chivalry, allowed the English to cross a bridge unmolested, the result of Flodden Field might have been very different from what it was.

THE FUTURE OF CANADA.

"Sir John Macdonald knows as well as any living man can know anything, that if he and Sir Hector Langevin were to-morrow to declare for union with the United States, they would carry with them much more than one-half of the Conservative party of Canada. In fact, we believe that if half a dozen leading Conservatives were to take up the question, the vast majority of that party would take sides with them." So wrote the *St. John Globe* in an article under the same heading as our own about a fortnight ago. It is almost needless to say that we think the *Globe* utterly mistaken. The *Globe* has strong affinities for the United States, and naturally makes the most of the amount of annexation sympathy which it is disposed to think exists in Canada. We have no means at present of testing the matter, but we believe the immense majority of Canadians share our distaste for institutions and social habits to which we think those of our own country in many respects preferable. The appeal of the Annexationist is essentially to the pocket and advocacy of the pocket, even is sustained by a good deal of special pleading. The appeal of the Canadian is to the heart, where, indeed, no appeal ought to be necessary, and all that is to be said about it in the end is, that if the Canadian is of too tame a temperament to stand for the country of his birth and youth, he stands confessed as "the man with soul so dead," fit only for colonial leading strings, or for incorporation with a more spirited power.

As an instance of the special pleading, we quote the following sentence:—"A fear that the mother country might have sentimental objections to union with the United States retards, but does not arrest the growth of a desire for that union." As a matter of fact, no such fear exists. There is no point in the great questions now before the country more absolutely certain than that Great Britain will not lift a finger in opposition to the wishes of Canada definitely and deliberately expressed, whether she decides for Annexation or Independence. There is always a compensatory balance in international arrangements effected by mutual consent. If Canada elected Annexation the relations of England with the States would probably be entirely unembarrassed for all time. If she elected Independence (and we desire to discuss all possibilities) the result to the old country would be the same, for, as we have said before, the aggressive antagonism of the United States is prompted quite as much by the traditionally fostered dislike of England as by considerations of commerce. We have sufficient confidence in the magnanimity of the better-feeling portion—which we do not doubt to be a majority—of Americans, to believe that if Canada were independent no great difficulties would be found to stand in the way of commercial

arrangements. There is even some advantage in the caution, and the expediency of a conciliatory policy, which would naturally present themselves as desirable on the part of a weaker nation dealing with a powerful neighbor.

The rapid growth of Canada has evidently impressed upon the Monroe doctrinists that now is the moment to strike, or it may in a few years be too late. Their activity has impelled the Imperial Federationists to a like conviction. But the complicated considerations of the latter measure have not advanced beyond the broad view of its desirability, and a consideration of its difficulties. If the Imperial Federationists are taunted with their inability to formulate a reasonably practical scheme, it may on the other hand be asked of the Annexationists on what basis are we to join the American union? It is easy to answer, "each Province as a State," but many of the American Federal elective arrangements, such as the election by the popular vote of whole "tickets" embracing offices of the most trivial description, would seem strange and unfamiliar to our people, and we should be embroiled in the quadrennial turmoil of the election of a Chief Magistrate, in whom, probably, not one Canadian in ten thousand would feel the slightest personal interest, and, notwithstanding the carefully and persistently re-iterated assertion that the Dominion has no bond of union, we entirely disbelieve that a vast majority of our countrymen would contemplate with complacency the suppression of the national autonomy, which, after struggling through a minority seriously embarrassed by faction and cowardice, is about to vindicate its inherent vigor, if it be not nipped in the bud by "alternatives" sprung upon it out of due time, and often urged for no better purpose than to serve party ends, or as a vent to the chronic discontent of minds restless with vanity and the craving for notoriety.

The general tone of the Press indicates that Canada is neither alarmed by the bluster mainly incidental to the Presidential campaign, nor cajoled by the blandishments of Senator Sherman, whose treatment of the subject is only redeemed from being insulting by an evident desire not to be offensive.

Canada is to-day like a maiden subjected to the persecutions of a coarse but wealthy suitor, whose advances are so brutal and self-sufficient that they succeed only in inspiring insuperable disgust in the victim of them; but, if we do not mistake, she will take courage and confidence in the splendid national future before her if she be true to herself, and will sum up the annexation question in the words of Isaiah—"For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways!"

THE DEAD KAIZER'S DIARY.

The publication of the extracts from the Diary of the late Emperor Frederic is in many respects a very curious affair. There are doubts as to the genuineness of at least some of them, and it is yet uncertain by whose authority, connivance, or manipulation, they came to see the light. We are not surprised that Prince Bismarck should deem the publication a subject for prosecution, as some of the relations made amount to state secrets, and others are calculated to do public damage in the present state of the country.

It is altogether unlikely that the Empress Victoria should have sanctioned the step, as, although no doubt jealous for the reputation of her husband, and not much in accord with Prince Bismarck, it is most improbable that a Princess of sound knowledge and ability, who must be perfectly cognizant of the necessity of reticence in matters of state where even the interests of peace might be jeopardized by undue disclosures, could allow any personal feeling to tempt her to a disregard of it, though the blow to Prince Bismarck no doubt comes from the unscrupulous party which has before now caused him both annoyance and danger. This question the German courts will fight out for themselves, though the solution, if obtained, will not be without interest to everyone who watches the threatening and lowering sky of European politics.

The Diary, however, if it be not garbled, has two points of singular interest. It would appear, in the first place, that it was the then Crown Prince, and not, as was universally believed, Prince Bismarck, who, with keen intuition, saw the moment at which the consolidation of Germany could, if ever, be accomplished by placing the Imperial Crown on the head of the King of Prussia. He it was who urged on the consummation at a time when the great Chancellor himself feared and hesitated, and, if for no other reason, it is easy to imagine the disgust of Prince Bismarck at having the wind thus taken out of his sails at a time when the public conviction of his prescience and astuteness is of considerable importance.

The other remarkable point is the revelation that the Emperor Napoleon, with the wildness of a drowning man catching at a straw, attempted to induce the Germans to modify the terms "of the peace conditions or promise of a common war against England," thus, in fact, run the words of the laconic diary.

England was very slow to believe the thorough, though weak, perfidy of the charlatan who was clever enough to make her fatuous statesmen his cat-paw against Russia, in which matter the evil that he did lives after him, for to that wretched fiasco is due the Russophobia which has lasted ever since, and has converted a very good friend and ally into an annoyed, digusted and suspicious neighbor.

It is remarkable that Louis Napoleon could have brought himself to believe, as he must have done, that such a proposition would weigh with the Germans to re-impose him on his unwilling country. It is probable that his mental faculties, always shallow, were impaired by the stupendous ruin into which he had plunged both France and himself. The English, with more good nature than perspicacity, ascribed to him the exhibition of a certain dignity in his captivity. The new revelation, though only showing what might be expected from the man who could project the partition of Belgium, destroys the last vestige of—we will not say respect—but toleration for his memory. It is well the line is extinct.