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requirements. The discussion itself, however, illustrates Canada's difficulty in ationalizing its defence policy, particularly in regard to decisions on equipment, for the critical variables are political, not dilitary. This is a matter of good fortune

for the citizenry, but not for defence planners, who are required to translate the intangibles of diplomatic calculation into ships and aircraft, and then to justify the value of such weapon systems in military terms.

By an exchange of notes on May 8, 1975, Canada and the United States agreed to continue their co-operation in NORAD for another five years. The Canadian note listed a number of "principles" that would govern the relationship. These include:

- 1. The Commander-in-Chief, NORAD (CINCNORAD), and his Deputy in CINCNORAD's absence, will be responsible to the Chief of Defence Staff of Canada and the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States, who, in turn, are responsible to their respective Governments. They will operate within a concept of surveillance, warning, control and defence approved by the appropriate authorities of our two Governments, who will bear in mind their objectives in the defence of the Canada-United States Region of the NATO area.
- 2. The North American Air Defence Command will include such combat units and individuals as are specifically allocated to it by the two Governments. The jurisdiction of the Commander-in-Chief, NORAD, over those units and individuals is limited to operational control as hereinafter defined.
- 3. "Operational Control" is the power to direct, co-ordinate, and control the operational activities of forces assigned, attached, or otherwise made available. No permanent changes of station would be made without approval of the higher national authority concerned. Temporary reinforcement from one area to another, including the crossing of the international boundary, to meet operational re-

quirements will be within the authority of commanders having operational control. The basic command organization for the defence forces of the two countries, including administration, discipline, internal organization and unit training, shall be exercised by national commanders responsible to their national authorities.

- 4. The appointment of CINCNORAD and his Deputy must be approved by the Canadian and United States Governments. They will not be from the same country, and the CINC-NORAD staff shall be an integrated joint staff composed of officers of both countries. During the absence of CINCNORAD, command will pass to the Deputy Commander.
- 5. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization will continue to be kept informed through the Canada-United States Regional Planning Group of arrangements for the air defence of North America.
- 6. The plans and procedures to be followed by NORAD in wartime shall be formulated and approved by appropriate national authorities and shall be capable of rapid implementation in an emergency. Any plans or procedures recommended by NORAD which bear on the responsibilities of civilian departments or agencies of the two Governments shall be referred for decision by the appropriate military authorities to those agencies and departments and may be the subject of inter-governmental co-ordination through an appropriate medium such as the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, Canada-United States.