treat and a jury assessed the compensation, which the defendants paid into Court. Cooke, one of the mortgagees, refused to be bound by the jury's finding, and the defendants thereupon served her with notice to treat, she then brought the present action alleging that the defendants had taken possession of the land and claiming an account of what was due on her mortgage, damages for injuries to the property, and an injunction. The defendants then gave the plaintiff notice to proceed to assess the compensation payable to her under their notice to treat, and she applied for an interlocutory injunction to restrain the council from proceeding to summon a jury, or otherwise proceeding under their notice to treat; but Parker, J., before whom the motion was made, decided that even if the defendants had taken possession that fact did not preclude them from exercising their statutory right to give notice to treat, or to proceed thereon, and he therefore refused the injunction.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT—LIMITED COMPANY EMPLOYED AS AGENT—COMPANY EMPLOYING ITS OFFICIALS—PROFITS OF OFFICIALS—SALARY AND COMMISSION.

In *Bath* v. *Standard Land Co.* (1911) 2 Ch. 618, the Court of Appeal (Cozens-Hardy, M.R., and Moulton and Buckley, L.JJ.), while affirming the decision of Neville, J. (1910) 1 Ch. 408 (noted ante, p. 14), in so far as he held that the defendant company was not entitled to make any charge for keeping the accounts of the estate of which it was manager, have reversed it, in so far as he held that it could not recover from the trust estate the profit costs of its own directors employed as solicitor and auctioneer. Moulton, L.J., however, dissented. The majority of the Court of Appeal held that the directors stood in a fiduciary relation to the company, but not to the plaintiff, and that the profit costs paid to them by the company for services rendered in respect of the estate of which the company was manager might be allowed to it in its accounts. The view of Moulton, L.J., on the other hand was that where a company undertakes the administration of a trust the directors can not use their position as de facto administrators of the trust, to profit themselves or one another; and there seems to be a great deal to be said in favour of that view, as it is easy to see that great abuses might arise if not only a trust company is allowed to make a profit, but its directors also are allowed to make individual profits out of estates committed to the company for administration.