

The Address—Mr. Diefenbaker

The writer then goes on to speak about those wonderful days when Canada had such an international reputation. Let me read this passage:

It would be valuable above all to have a complete picture of the way Canadian relations with the United States were handled. Dr. Eayrs most properly devotes the longest chapter of his book to this subject. It is sandwiched between an account of the travails of the truce commissions in Indo-China and a spine-tingling tale of Mr. Paul Martin's efforts at the U.N. assembly of 1955 to secure the admission of new members (which loses nothing of excitement by drawing heavily on Mr. Martin's own version of it).

That is what hon. gentlemen opposite want us to go back to. Let me read what Mr. Barkway has to say a little further on:

Examples of the confusion and mismanagement in this most vital area of foreign policy could fill a book. In this small compass, and with necessarily incomplete knowledge, it may be best to indicate some of the unpublished background to just three of the problems Dr. Eayrs deals with.

Mention was made by hon. members of the opposition a few months ago of the Columbia river. What did Mr. Barkway have to say about that?

The most graphic are, perhaps, the Columbia river, continental defence, and economic affairs. On major economic questions the Department of External Affairs could do little between 1955 and 1957 except to tag along after Mr. Howe.

What a picture of those latter days is revealed here. Reading on, we find this:

On defence questions it could occasionally mitigate the effects of the armed services' bargains with Washington, but more often had to salvage such traces of decency as a man may gather to himself after losing his shirt and pants in a poker game.

I am reading from one of the pundits of parliament.

In the early Columbia river negotiations it obstructed and very nearly ruined the defence of Canadian interests which General McNaughton maintained almost single-handed.

Then the article goes on to say this in reference to another question:

The worst of it, which has never before been told, is that the draft note which Mr. Pearson and Mr. St. Laurent both approved did not merely question the adequacy of the 1909 treaty: it actually said that it was *not* adequate to deal with the Columbia case. There can seldom have been a more timorous or unnecessary surrender.

Those were the days to which hon. members opposite wish us to return, the days when Canada's image, as a result of the attitude taken by the opposition in joining with the government in maintaining that image, was known all over the world. There was not any of this smear operation.

If the opposition want any more read I can read a number of further pages on the subject.

Mr. Pickersgill: Go on.

[Mr. Diefenbaker.]

Mr. Diefenbaker: I think I have read enough to indicate a complete answer. Those who would like to read more will find a copy of the magazine, I understand, in the library.

I will have a word to say regarding the mover and seconder of the address—and I shall enlarge on that—but there is one matter to which I wish to refer particularly at this time. It was not dealt with by the hon. member for Algoma East and understandably so. In accordance with our Canadianization policy, one of the things we did shortly after we took office was to set up a royal commission known as the O'Leary commission. Speaking of royal commissions, there was a reference by the Leader of the Opposition to the number of royal commissions we have set up. I have not the exact figure in mind but my recollection is that we have set up some 13 and that the Liberal party in the same period of time set up 12.

Royal commissions are set up for the purpose of securing information and making recommendations which, by reason of the complexity of events, would be impossible to secure otherwise. We set up this royal commission, and in the few moments at my disposal I intend to place before the house and the country the recommendations we intend to implement. But do not let the Leader of the Opposition run away with the idea that I shall not be back at eight o'clock in order to deal with some further matters.

On June 15, 1961, I tabled in the house the report of the royal commission on publications. Since then there has been time for a mature and searching appraisal by the government, and by the public, of the conclusions and recommendations of the commission and the information and argument on which they are based.

The commission, in vigorous and persuasive language, calls our attention to the unique role that Canadian magazines play, or ought to play, in our national life. The report states:

So far as the printed word is concerned, it is largely left to our periodical press, to our magazines big and little, to make a conscious appeal to the nation; to try to interpret Canada to all Canadians, to bring a sense of oneness to our scattered communities. It is but necessary to note the veritable deluge of United States publications submerging Canadian print on our newsstands to understand the magnitude and, in the past, the impossibility, of their task.

So pervasive, indeed, is this penetration, so obviously fraught with social and economic consequences, no examination of any aspect of Canadian communications can fail to take it into account. Here, inescapably, is the stuff of national concern.

The commission then proceeds to examine the case made by publishers of Canadian