

of the world. The international control authority must be so constituted as to be impartial and the impartiality of its agents must be trusted. This is a field of policy in which no country can afford to make mistakes and no people can risk being duped, for the stakes are their survival as free men.

Whether the proposal is to prohibit the atomic weapon unconditionally or to cut the armaments and armed forces of the great powers by one-third this year, the question comes back to whether it is possible to agree on effective inspection. As I understand it, the Soviet Union still go no further than saying that they will permit agents of an international control authority to inspect places they choose at times of their choosing, but they will not have United Nations inspectors stationed permanently anywhere, and they will not give them the right to go wherever they think necessary whenever they wish. This means that their kind of inspection would amount to no more than continuing periodic visits to selected plants - in other words the international inspectors would be allowed to go where it was safe to take them and they would see what it was safe to show them. Again I ask the Soviet representative to correct me if I misrepresent his position.

We must all agree that this kind of inspection would mean a minimum of interference in the domestic affairs of states; but it would not be effective inspection. No disarmament plan can ever be based on this kind of inspection. That must be very clearly understood and appreciated by all. Atomic weapons or bacteriological weapons can be declared prohibited tomorrow and agreement reached to cut the forces of the great powers by any fraction you like, but with inspection as so far defined by the Soviet Delegation there is no guarantee whatever that these decisions would be faithfully carried out. Let us hope that either during the present discussion or at any rate during the Disarmament Commission's meetings between now and the next Session of the Assembly, the Soviet representative will come forward with more detailed and more realistic proposals concerning the kind of inspection which his government would be prepared to agree to as part and parcel of a comprehensive disarmament programme. Such proposals would immediately give the Disarmament Commission's work more reality and more hope.

As the report of the Disarmament Commission shows, detailed proposals have been submitted by the Western powers covering several basic elements of such a comprehensive programme. These proposals include not only an elaboration of the principles basic to any disarmament agreement - principles elaborated from the Assembly's resolution No. 502(VI) establishing the Disarmament Commission - but cover disclosure and verification of armed forces and armaments, and the proposals for the limitation and reduction of all armed forces. The latter paper, dealing with the limitation and reduction of armed forces, proposes in effect that the armed forces of the Soviet Union and the United States should be cut not by one-third but, according to our estimates, by more than one half their present strength as part of a balanced limitation and reduction of forces on both sides. Again it is of the essence that any reduction or limitation should not be a shot in the dark but should proceed from known and verified facts. We come back again to the necessity for fully effective inspection - a necessity which the Soviet Union has continued to sidestep or ignore.