

If the Chinese communists change that situation, the responsibility for the consequence would rest entirely with them and not with the United Nations forces.

I am, of course, ...aware that this policy of restraint in which all the governments who have forces in Korea concur to the best of my knowledge, may complicate the problems facing the United Nations commanders in Korea. These problems, however, in the opinion of many, would be immensely more complicated if the fighting were extended to China.

The question, I think, above all other questions at the moment, is, in short, whether aerial bombardment of points in China, together with a naval blockade and the removal of all restrictions from Chinese forces in Formosa, would be sufficient to bring China's participation in the war in Korea to an end, without bringing about intervention by the forces of the Soviet Union. It was felt by many last November that if United Nations forces advanced to the very borders of Manchuria and cleared North Korea of the enemy, the war would then end; that there would be little risk of communist China intervening, or, that, if it did, the intervention could be contained and defeated. As we know, and as I said last February in the house, it did not work out that way, for one reason or another. In the light of that experience, we should, I think, before we take any new decisions which will extend the war, be reasonably sure that this extension will have compensating military and political advantages. Let us not forget we would be playing for the highest stakes in history.

Another way in which the conflict could be extended, in the hope that it would be ended sooner, would be by facilitating and assisting the return to the mainland of China of the forces at present in Formosa under the command of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. We should remember, of course, that these forces, or forces under the same command, have been driven from China by their own countrymen. The question to be answered, therefore, is this: Is there any reason to believe that these Chinese nationalist forces now in Formosa would have greater success in China than they had previously, unless they were supported by troops and equipment from other countries which could ill be spared for such a hazardous venture, with all its possible long-drawn-out consequences?

The desire to localize the conflict and prevent it from spreading remains, then, our policy, though we must recognize that while it takes only one to start a fight, it takes two to limit, as well as two to settle, a fight.

May I now say just a word in conclusion...about our views...on the situation in Formosa. I believe that this island should be neutralized while fighting is going on in Korea. I have expressed that view previously. Certainly the United States of America cannot be expected to permit the Peking government to take over Formosa while that government is defying, and fighting against, the United Nations. It does not follow, however, that if and when the Korean conflict can be ended satisfactorily, we should refuse to discuss the future of Formosa within the context of international agreements that have already been reached concerning it, and indeed within the context of the United Nations Charter. Any other course would, I think, result in implacable hostility between the United Nations and