

Regarding IGAD and the IGAD peace process, including the IPF, Canada should:

- promote the reconfiguration of the IGAD process from sporadic, ad hoc meetings of its members into a continuing process and take it from the public sphere into private negotiations to prevent the parties from public posturing;
- promote the comprehensiveness of its membership by including non-IGAD actors such as the IPF, opposition and rebel groups in Sudan, NGOs;
- attempt to level the playing field so that the Sudanese opposition might more effectively participate in and affect the peace process;
- engage Sudanese civil society in the peace process and search for mechanisms to allow for such engagement, including organising support for this engagement in the IPF and among other external actors;
- pursue a broader scope of the conflict for IGAD to more accurately reflect the national character of the Sudan conflict;
- transform the IGAD process and the IPF into a middle-power issue (involving Canada, Norway, Italy, the Netherlands), especially given that US policy towards Sudan is compromised and unclear and that US policy is attributed an anti-Muslim sentiment by Muslim governments in the region; furthermore, the escalated mistrust of the US in the region in light of the US bombing of the pharmaceutical factory in Sudan allows the middle powers to emerge as the natural leaders in the settlement of this conflict;
- clarify American foreign policy regarding Sudan and the region, and in the process increase the credibility of the IGAD process in the eyes of Sudan; and impress on the US that issues other than terrorism are at stake regarding Sudan, and gain US support on some of these other issues;
- take on a more activist role for itself in the IPF and openly engage Sudan and make this engagement transparent, reinforce the moderates in the Khartoum government, use its economic links, and support Sudanese civil society while remaining aware of the core group of extremists in the Sudanese government;
- use the notional deadline of 2001 (when the Sudanese government will be in a position to collect oil revenues and launch a devastating offensive against the opposition) to encourage progress by the opposition in the negotiations;
- prohibit support for the Sudanese rebels by neighbouring countries in order to pressure the opposition to settle;

Regarding the upcoming IPF mission, Canada should:

- promote the view that only middle powers attend the IPF;
- avoid an overt agenda and objectives for the IPF mission because the situation in Sudan is fluid enough and the IPF mission can at a minimum be used to simply clarify the situation;
- promote the inclusion of civil society representatives who would engage in dialogue with their counterparts in Sudan;
- promote a Canadian initiative targetting small arms in the region, and seek the support of the Sudanese Ministry of Defence, the Foreign Ministry, police;
- promote economic engagement of the right kind, and encourage humanitarian agencies to recognise that offenders of human rights are also found among the opposition groups;

Regarding other matters directly pertaining to the conflict, Canada should:

- promote the extension of the cease-fire between the Khartoum government and the SPLM beyond October, ideally even permanently, and its expansion to other actors;