

openness about overall holdings of conventional weapons. We believe the provision of such data, and a procedure for seeking clarification, would be a valuable confidence- and security-building measure.

The principle of *consultation* should now be strengthened through the rapid implementation of recent initiatives for discussions among leading exporters with the aim of agreeing on a common approach to the guidelines which are applied in the transfer of conventional weapons....

The principle of *action* requires all of us to take steps to prevent the building up of disproportionate arsenals. To that end all countries should refrain from arms transfers which would be destabilising or would exacerbate existing tensions. Special restraint should be exercised in the transfer of advanced technology weapons....³

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

Canada is not a leading exporter of armaments, being a distant eighth largest in exports to the industrialized countries (with \$25 million in sales in 1990 out of a total US \$9,885 million in total sales to industrialized countries), and outside the top ten in sales to Third World countries. In a position paper released in September 1990, the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Department of External Affairs restated the basic Canadian position on arms exports. Canada exercises governmental controls over arms sales to all countries except the United States. Under the 1986 Export Controls Policy, the export of military goods and technology is "generally" denied to the following:

- countries that pose a threat to Canada and its allies;
- countries involved in or under the imminent threat of hostilities;
- countries under Security Council sanctions; and
- countries whose governments have a persistent record of serious violations of human rights, unless it can be demonstrated that there is no reasonable risk that the goods might be used against the civilian population.

While generally not breaking any new ground, the September 1990 paper did mark an apparent shift in the Canadian approach. Previously, as for example in response to the 1986 recommendation by the Hockin-Simard Parliamentary Committee for an arms control register, the Department of External Affairs had expressed skepticism about the value of transparency and its effect on limiting transfers. The September paper commented that "[w]e believe that issues of arms transfer transparency are best addressed before issues of arms transfer control," thus appearing to envisage transparency as

³London Economic Summit 1991. *Declaration on Conventional Arms Transfers and NBC Non-Proliferation*, 15-17 July 1991.