

Technical Means of verification.<sup>21</sup> Although this set of measures is considerably more extensive than the Helsinki CBMs, it still does not quite support a generalized and coherent conception of CBMs nor can it, as a consequence, accommodate comfortably the list of historical as well as contemporary arms control agreements discussed earlier as candidate CBMs. This is due less to the fact that Associated Measures are too tentative and narrow in scope (the main fault with the Helsinki CBMs) than it is to their *composite* construction. They are a combination of pre-notification measures (similar to but more extensive than the Helsinki CBMs), problem-solving and verification-enhancing measures and inspection measures. This combination of proposed measures is the result of an effort to address a number of discrete conventional-force problems and concerns specific to the NATO-Warsaw Pact balance in Central Europe. The binding together of solutions to discrete, almost idiosyncratic problems in a CBM package inevitably results in an unfocused organizing concept. Looking at the specific features of the proposed Associated Measures, could one easily infer what a Confidence-Building Measure is? Probably not.

The inference of a general explanation of the CBM concept from existing historical examples of international agreements does not appear to be a very productive undertaking. The resulting explanations of "what is a CBM?" are too dependent upon specific examples. More seriously, there is little consistency amongst the various "definitions" based on (1) Helsinki CBMs, (2) Associated Measures, or (3) the list

of arms-control-derived candidate CBMs. Each example produces a different definition and list of measures. This pattern of inconsistent and incompatible interpretations, all apparently based on the original minimalist Helsinki CBMs and all ostensibly compatible, hints strongly that there is no genuine basic agreement about the nature of the Confidence-Building concept. Once we move beyond the specifics of the exceptionally modest Helsinki CBMs, the status of potential Confidence-Building Measures (are they or aren't they?) becomes questionable.

Given this lack of clarity, perhaps we might have better luck if we turn directly to the work of academic analysts and examine their attempts to conceptualize the CBM idea beyond the confines of existing, substantive and inherently narrow applications. Looking at the *generalized* notions of the CBM concept produced and explored by analysts may permit us to construct a more flexible, wider-ranging and internally consistent understanding of CBMs and CSBMs.<sup>22</sup> At the very least, it should expand our conception of Confidence-Building beyond specific applications. Without a measureable improvement in our conceptual thinking we will stand little chance of understanding the genuine prospects or the potential problems associated with this as yet ill-defined but potentially important arms control approach.<sup>23</sup>

### Basic Definitions

Analytic efforts to clarify our thinking about Confidence-Building Measures generally can be divided into two sorts of activity. The first is the construction of definitions – general statements telling us what a CBM is. The second approach is much more complex and entails the construction of typologies or categories. Although the two activities are seldom con-

<sup>21</sup> It has been argued that not all of the Associated Measures are really CBMs. This seems to be an excessively narrow interpretation based upon the belief that only the Helsinki CBMs – or their very close analogues – define the content of legitimate measures. At best, such an interpretation is premature. It has yet to be demonstrated that this understanding of CBM status is correct or even sensible.

<sup>22</sup> Recall that CSBMs – Confidence and Security Building Measures – are "second-generation" (that is to say, more "ambitious," demanding or constraining) CBMs in contrast to the fairly limited "first generation" Helsinki CBMs. Whether or not the two terms should be used interchangeably in a generic sense is not clear although some authors do so without remark. The usage adopted in this study employs the term CBM generically and uses CSBM to refer to specific, Stockholm-related Confidence-Building-Measure proposals.

<sup>23</sup> It could be argued that from a "diplomat's perspective" deliberate ambiguity can be constructive to the extent that it permits dissimilar positions to co-exist. Even if this is true, ambiguity should be a *controlled* attribute, wielded with skill and based on a keen appreciation of a concept's full meaning. What we have seen thus far suggests, to the contrary, a serious *unintentional* ambiguity – the sort that can breed serious confusion, disappointment, and eventual contention in the market place of ideas.

