

that Canada would have more influence if it did not participate in the various operations. A further factor is one of 'ambiguity'. Since peacekeeping involves compromises and the U.N. moves from weakness to weakness then Canada is put in the same position. The last argument against further peacekeeping is related to the domestic situation. "Canada herself is basically an underdeveloped nation....If we are going to send out best diplomats and our best soldiers and our best equipment on various peacekeeping ventures, we have got to bear in mind the kind of price that we are going to pay domestically." For these reasons Gordon contends Canada should take a serious look at peacekeeping as an instrument of foreign policy in the future.¹⁵

James Eayrs has also been pessimistic about peacekeeping as "the environment in which interposition (peacekeeping) is carried out has changed since the days of the Suez crisis. The success of Suez has encouraged us to regard it as a prototype. It was in fact an aberation.... We will only deceive ourselves if we imagine that in 1965 we are as uniquely qualified to undertake these missions as we were in 1956."¹⁶ Peyton Lyon seems to agree with the Eayrs position as he feels it will be unlikely if Canadian participation in peacekeeping operations is welcomed in the future. One problem may be that "the likeliest demands of peace-keepers in the future will be such that many Canadians will be opposed to participation." Furthermore, "our leadership during the misguided attempt to secure a legal solution to the financial difficulties, essentially a political problem, has rendered our activity suspect to France, the Soviet Union, and others who share their views." According to Lyon, however, this is no reason to abandon enthusiastic support for peacekeeping. "Rather it is to caution that the role may not be as satisfying to Canadians in the future."¹⁷

Pessimism has also been apparent in academic attitudes toward a permanent international force.¹⁸ Eayrs has written that on face value a standing force seems sensible and attractive, but it has "little chance of adoption; nor is its adoption desirable" since it assumes the existence of a concert of great powers, the host countries would want a say in the composition and in most cases improvisation would be unavoidable to meet different situations.¹⁹ John Holmes²⁰ feels that arguments in favour of a permanent force are indisputable, but are politically unfeasible which puts him in substantial agreement with Eayrs.

While pessimism cuts across traditionalist-revisionist lines not all academics have taken this position. Some revisionists (Chapter II) see this function as the clear alternative to the alliance system, but in the majority of cases serious analysis of the implications of future participation is lacking. Jack Granatstein is one of the few academics who remains quite optimistic about future operations, and considers peacekeeping to be the only defence objective which possesses growth potential. According to Granatstein "the need for peace-keepers can only increase, and it seems probable that the U.N.'s appeals for troops will continue to go to those nations that are prepared. Canada is."²¹ When compared to other academic attitudes the optimism shown here is the exception rather than the rule.