

beyond the fact that he had failed entirely to influence British policy before November. Pearson enjoyed the confidence of the Prime Minister, Louis St. Laurent, who was unassuming, informed, sympathetic to many Afro-Asian aspirations, but conscious of Canada's Atlantic heritage, and by no means unimportant in foreign policy. Canada's behavior in 1956 may well have been different had MacKenzie King still been Prime Minister. St. Laurent and Pearson were close; there was respect and a convergence of views. St. Laurent gave Pearson wide latitude; Pearson could count on St. Laurent's support.

Hail peacekeeping!

That was critical as Pearson experimented with the peacekeeping scheme to create the UNEF. The original idea was Pearson's, but Eden sold him on wrapping the Anglo-French invasion force in the UN flag, and only US intervention ensured that the international police action would be carried out by a genuine UN force. A Canadian concept and draft proposal went to Washington. It produced an American draft resolution which became the "Canadian" resolution (A/3276), which Pearson introduced and linked skillfully to a 19-power Afro-Asian resolution proposed by India. Both were adopted by the General Assembly in the early hours of November 4.

There is no doubt that Pearson, Heenev and the Canadian delegation at the UN played a role in bringing about an Anglo-American rapprochement. That role must not be

exaggerated. Moreover, Canadian efforts were not only sometimes misunderstood, but also regarded with a certain irritation. British officials did not need reminding that Canada had helped save Britain and France from their errors. Indeed, Canada tried to serve many causes and mend several fences; her officials saw all sides of every issue. And, as Dulles had always said, "Mike" was torn between loyalty to the West and his desire to be its problem-solver-in-chief. Finally, his role in the proposed sale of F-86 jet fighters to Israel hardly improved Canada's image of standing independently between Jew and Arab. Pearson's justification, in the disappointing second volume of his memoirs, lacked credibility.

Reid in Delhi

Escott Reid is no stranger to revisionism. His splendidly readable, carefully crafted memoir-monograph adds two important dimensions to the story. First, he explores the interrelationship between the Suez and Hungarian crises, and in a convincing and suggestive, if not exhaustive, way. The possible relationships are important: did Suez make the Soviet military suppression of the Hungarian revolt more likely and less dangerous; did the Hungarian crisis facilitate the Anglo-French-Israeli act of collusion and thus their aggression against Egypt; and did Suez rob the West of the moral high ground and severely limit its range of responses to

National Archives, Ottawa



Escott Reid and Lester Pearson contemplating globe