

greater readiness to listen to advocates of violent methods of struggle.

We can also expect an intensification of the policy of racial separation in the South African mould of *apartheid*. The new policy of provincialization, which is now to be embarked on, is simply another version of Bantustans.

Guerrilla strategy

So far, the guerrilla movement in Rhodesia has been ineffectual. The initial ZAPU and ZANU strategy of attempting guerrilla incursions into the country from Zambia ended in failure; it has been abandoned. There are signs of a new strategy being devised, which will seek to infiltrate trained guerrillas into the countryside to build up cells of resistance in the tribal trust areas. Such a policy will take time to develop. Meanwhile, it would be foolish to try to predict whether it will be successful or not. All one can say with any degree of confidence is that a new generation of young black leaders has begun to emerge in the last few years. The most impressive of these have been received into the new Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI), which has linked up with an important section of ZAPU. The new leader, Sheldon Samwela, is a graduate of Boston University and is impressive by any standards.

The OAU has officially recognized FROLIZI as well as its rival ZANU-ZAPU Joint Military Command. The future development of these Zimbabwe guerrilla movements will depend on two external factors: the willingness and ability of President Kaunda to sustain their bases in Zambia; and the fortunes of FRELIMO in Mozambique. In the middle-term future, Rhodesia's stability may be largely affected by the capacity of the Portuguese to retain their control over Tete Province. Too little attention has, as yet, been given to the significance of the Portuguese troubles in Tete and its likely effects on the security of Rhodesia.

Ian Colvin of the London *Daily Telegraph*, a writer normally sympathetic to the Portuguese, wrote after a recent visit to the area: "... Mozambique could be described as the sick man of Southern Africa in that Communist-trained guerrillas swarm in its remoter areas and pose an invisible threat to the Cabora-Bassa hydro-electric project. In Rhodesia and South Africa, there is even concern that the Portuguese might set up a black Government as a means of extricating Portugal from increasing pressures from the militant African states."

Reports of guerrilla gains tend to be

minimized by the Portuguese and their allies and to be exaggerated by their enemies. A more careful evaluation would treat sceptically claims that FRELIMO can quickly break Portuguese rule or that the Portuguese are winning. The Portuguese have, in fact, slowly been losing ground since guerrilla operations began in 1963; their position has become more difficult, especially since the middle of 1971.

It is wrong to evaluate the Portuguese position only in terms of Mozambique. Their capacity to wage a long war of attrition will be greatly affected by the simultaneous pressures on them in Guinea-Bissau and Angola. These combined pressures will in turn continue to affect political development inside Portugal itself, where the Caetano regime faces three rival challenges: the militant left-wing resistance movement; the ultra right-wing militarist-commercial coalition, with strong vested interests in Portuguese Africa; and the new class of technocrats and industrialists, who see their future as members of the European Community. In the end, Portugal's policies in Africa — and their repercussions on Rhodesia and South Africa — will be determined by the interplay of forces in metropolitan Portugal and the Portuguese colonies.

The predictable effects of a deteriorating security position along the Rhodesia-Mozambique frontier will be to reinforce the Rhodesian Front's determination to maintain white supremacy and not to yield to any winds of change. But though nobody should underrate the determination of white Rhodesians to defend their way of life, their capacity to do so would be greatly affected by any serious weakening along their Portuguese flank. Not only would this increase their security risks and call for increased expenditure on security forces, it would threaten their shortest route to the sea and seriously impede their elaborate sanctions-breaking machinery.

The Portuguese factor, therefore, is of crucial importance to white Rhodesia. Here again one must sound a note of caution; it is necessary always to keep in mind two possibilities: first, that the Zambia regime could change to something resembling Malawi's; and second, that South Africa might move its armies across its frontiers to underpin the outer perimeter of the "White Redoubt". The latter possibility is real so long as Mr. Vorster remains in power; it would be less certain if he should be supplanted by a *verkrampste* leader like Dr. Andries Treurnicht, since there is a strong tradition among the inward-looking section of Afrikanerdom to draw its *laager* firmly within South Africa's own

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