

had a right, and it was its duty to have forbidden the attorney from changing sides in the same suit, though at different trials; for to do otherwise was "to defeat the very purpose for which courts were organized, viz., the administration of justice." *Wilson v. State*, 16 Ind. 392. The evidence in this case and the statement of the attorney himself was sufficient to show the court that his intention was, for the benefit of the defendant, to use at that time all the knowledge and secrets he had gained from his former client in preparing for and conducting one trial, and observing and watching the developments of two others. This court, speaking to such a question, says: "We are of opinion that the court in that case would have restrained him, even had he been unjustly discharged, and he was allowed, as contended, to be employed by the adverse party. The law secures the client the privilege of objecting at all times and forever to an attorney, solicitor or counsellor from disclosing information in a cause confidentially given while the relation exists. The client alone can release the attorney, solicitor or counsel from this obligation. The latter cannot discharge himself from the duty imposed on him by law." *In re Cowdery*, 69 Cal. 50. The attorney himself boldly avowed his intention so to act. The court permitted him to do it, notwithstanding the plaintiff's objection. This we think was an error, and in the absence of any proof to the contrary, injury must be presumed to have resulted to the plaintiff, whereby he was prevented from having a fair trial of his case."—*Albany Law Journal*.

POWER OF SOLICITOR TO BIND CLIENT.—The counsel of record, representing married women in pending litigation, have an ample power to bind their clients in conducting and disposing of such litigation as have the counsel of other suitors, and decrees rendered with consent of counsel without fraud, are obligatory upon their clients, the consent of counsel being in law the consent of the parties they represent. There seems to be an opinion, which makes its appearance in records very frequently, that married women are privileged suitors; that when they come before the courts they come with a sort of shield against being bound in favour of their adversaries, and with the right to bind them in all matters whatsoever. Now this is a grave mistake. When a suitor comes into court, competent to select counsel, and does select counsel, no matter who the suitor may be, or how much married, the counsel is there for the purpose of representing the client, and whatever the counsel assents to the client assents to. There is full power on the part of the counsel to represent the client, and it is just the same as if the client were there in person; and it is no answer to a decree, a solemn judgment of the court, for the client to come in and say that the counsel misrepresented the client's interests, or did not represent the client's wishes. Let the client see that the counsel conforms to instructions, and if there is any injury by failure to do it, let the counsel answer for it, and not the other party. In this case, whatever gain was to this lady as against her adversary, was absolutely secured by the decree. The decree was carried into effect, and