

Cruise missile in Canada. But that obligation, related as it is to arms control negotiations, in no way required the Canadian Government to sign a bilateral agreement with the United States to test all manner of American weapons systems on Canadian territory. Yet that is the situation the Government created on February 10, 1983, when it signed the umbrella agreement with the U.S. That is the situation into which we have been put.

Under this new agreement or umbrella arrangement we have no guarantee that the weapons which are to be tested in Canada in the future will be part of our alliance commitments. They could equally be used for counterinsurgency in any part of the world, and the decisions could be made in secret, with no guarantee that Parliament will ever have the opportunity to debate the merits of these arrangements. All of this is being done by a Government which promised to suffocate the arms race in the laboratories. It is being done by a Government which has scarcely made any contribution to the discussion of arms control in Europe. Since the decision was taken in 1979, three and a half years have gone by and the Government has not yet been seized of the urgency of this situation. Surely it should realize that now is the time for Canada to take the initiative in an effort to move the negotiations forward. We should not underestimate our potential for doing so, nor our opportunity, nor indeed our responsibility.

If we look at the situation with regard to our other NATO colleagues, we realize it is extraordinary difficult for the British and the French to show flexibility because their nuclear forces are at the very heart or the centre of the dispute. For political reasons it is equally difficult for the West German Government to take the lead in the promotion of new ideas. If one looks at the political positions of the more junior members of NATO, one by one it becomes clear that there are precious few governments able to take initiatives and to introduce arms control proposals into public discussion. By contrast, Canada is in a position to test new ideas and to put into private and public discussion suggestions which may command some considerable support within the alliance. That is something we can do. As an interested and involved party, we should now be concentrating our efforts on presenting proposals to NATO which reflect both our own concerns and the political realities confronting our European allies, those I have mentioned.

We should begin not by engaging in a debate about the number of missiles on each side but by identifying some guiding principles. The Palme Commission suggested the notion of mutual security as the touchstone for negotiations with the Soviets. We should not, therefore, ignore the security dilemmas fed by the Soviets and we must realize the reality with which they live, namely that British and French or sea-based nuclear warheads are just as devastating as land-based warheads. Mutual security requires a formula and an approach which will deal with the Cruise and the SS-20 and will place them in the broader context of all medium range nuclear weapons currently targeted on both parts of Europe, East and West.

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Our task as Canadians is to consider some of these possible solutions. It is well within the capacities of our experts to evaluate them and to explore the common ground of Washington and our European partners. To be rebuffed in this exercise will be disheartening. If we were to undertake it and be rebuffed, it would indeed be disheartening, but not to attempt it at all would be an abandonment of our role and our interest in the alliance. It would be to forget that there is still a place for genuine mediation within the alliance. It would be to assume that we in Canada have entirely lost influence and credibility with our closest friends. It would be to accept passivity and helplessness as the mark of our international diplomacy.

There are times when I am critical of the Prime Minister (Mr. Trudeau) for some of his travels abroad, that they have not brought about the results that he or we might want to see. However, I would have no criticism, only commendation, if I could see the Prime Minister of this country engage in shuttle diplomacy from one country to the other in the western alliance to try to promote a much stronger effort by Canada for arms control negotiation in Geneva.

In this particular context, it is inappropriate to dwell upon specific numbers. Before we come to the precise arguments of the specialists, our task is to impose certain political principles on the negotiating process. Both in North America and in Europe there are hundreds of thousands of ordinary citizens who perhaps have seen more clearly than the scientists in defence laboratories and the strategists in the world of acronyms who know where present trends are leading us. We are faced with an apparently endless proliferation of nuclear weapons and destructive capabilities. Every new weapon has its own logic and its own reason, but the outcome is illogical, irrational and inhumane.

Therefore, and beginning with the INF negotiations Canada's approach to arms control should be guided by two broad principles. First, we must present realistic negotiating positions which emphasize minimal deployment of new weapon systems. We must begin to stem the tide of nuclear proliferation in Europe. Second, a negotiated outcome to the INF problem must encourage and actively promote further discussions on nuclear arms control.

In summary, the testing of the Cruise missile is not a decision which can or should be taken in isolation. Instead it must be placed, as I have argued, in the broader context of direction in arms control.

Finally, Canada must establish its own purposeful criteria for arms control and bend its efforts to achieving the only goal that in the long-term makes any sense, the progressive denuclearization of the world.

Mr. McRae: Mr. Speaker, I was pleased to hear the speech of the Hon. Member. I am sure she is aware that before 1963 there were 600 SS-4s and SS-5s deployed in the eastern European operation. The Americans withdrew their Jupiter and Thor missiles. Therefore, there were 600 single missile