the Privy Council. Then the hon. gentleman expressed his astonishment at the extraordinary legal knowledge possessed by these gentlemen. But, Sir, how did they become possessed of it. The members of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, when a case is appealed to them from the Province of Quebec, are obliged to consider the Civil Law and the customs of the Province in relation to the particular case before them. In a case brought from India, it may be the Mahommedan law which they are called upon to administer. If they display a very considerable knowledge of different systems of jurisprudence in the exercise of their judicial functions it is simply because the laws of every country are founded on the broad principles of natural justice. There is very little difference when you examine the first principles of jurisprudence whether you look at them in the old Roman law, the modern Roman law, or the English common law. Everywhere they are the same. The distinguished gentlemen who are called upon to adjudicate upon questions coming from India, from Lower Canada, or from other of the Colonies, before they become members of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council acquire a special knowledge of English law and equity which they are called upon to administer while they are upon the Bench. The training which they receive in the administration of the law of their own country prepares and fits them for the consideration of the laws of other countries which they are called upon to administer. There is no doubt that precisely the same effect will be produced in the Supreme Court here. Hon. gentlemen of the Bar of Halifax, of the Bar of New Brunswick and of the Bar of Ontario, when appointed to seats upon the Supreme Court Bench here—when they are called upon to consider questions involving principles of the Civil Code—will bring to bear their legal training and discipline in the consideration of legal questions arising under that Code. They are, in my opinion, likely to administer justice quite as fairly as those who have had special training in the law they are called upon to administer, and in that system alone. In fact, I believe it is an advantage to gentlemen who are called upon to administer one system of jurisprudence to have a previous knowledge of some different system. I believe they take larger and more comprehensive views. There can be no doubt whatever that the knowledge gentlemen in the Supreme Court have of English common law, and of the English system of equity jurisprudence, will be no detriment in the administration of Roman civil law in cases coming up from the Province of Quebec. We know that what we know as Roman law originated in this way. What is now called Roman law, is not the old Quirinal law, but a system of jurisprudence derived from the *jus quotienne* as administered by the Republic and the Empire. The hon. member for Halton spoke about the provision which authorizes Parliament here, with the consent of the Provinces, to establish uniform laws relating to the question of property and civil rights. That was a principle introduced into the Constitution at the time the Constitution was framed by those who favored a Legislative Union. It provides, if the principle is once adopted, that the right to legislate on the subject of property and civil rights shall no longer be vested in the Provinces, but in the Government here, and I do not think it is at all to be deplored that that provision of the Constitution has never been acted upon. On the contrary, I see no necessity for having a uniform system of procedure in the various Provinces. Everywhere the law will grow up and adapt itself to the wants and necessities of the community. The very object of having Local Legislatures is to enable them to adjust the laws with greater efficiency to local requirements; and if a Statute in the same words in the Province of New Brunswick is found to be differently interpreted from the provincial Statute of Ontario no inconvenience can arise from it. But there would be a great inconvenience if we had no common tribunal for the purpose of interpreting the laws of Canada. If you found one construction placed upon a law of Canada in Ontario, another in Quebec, and a third in the Maritime Provinces, great inconvenience would arise. The people would not know what the law was. The same law, intended to work uniformly in the entire country, would be differently interpreted in the different Provinces. I remember very well, a few years ago, that there was a Statute in the Province of Ontario, requiring the registration of judgments in certain cases. That law was construed in one way in the Court of Common Pleas, and in a different way in the Court of Queen's Bench. Great inconvenience would arise from a practice like that if there was no common tribunal giving a uniform interpretation to the law. For that reason, under a Federal system of Government you must have a supreme tribunal for the purpose of finally interpreting the Federal law, and I believe you have in the Supreme Court a very satisfactory tribunal. I think, considering the circumstances under which it was constituted, that it is a matter of surprise that the Supreme Court has worked as satisfactorily as it has so far. In a few years you will have a wholly different state of things to that which you had in the first instance. That there should be some difficulty and some friction is not a matter of surprise, but we can easily produce great mischief to this Court, and great mischief to the country, by attacking the Court every Session. The hon. member for Laval has spoken of the impropriety of having matters relating to the laws of the Provinces referred to the Supreme Court. I never entertained any other opinion on that question. According to the 101st section of the British North America Act, this was to be a final Court of Appeal for Canada, not for the Provinces. I never saw any impropriety in making it a Court of Appeal for the Provinces. If we recognize the principle well laid down by Mr. Chancellor Kent in his commentaries, that it is desirable to arrive at a final conclusion as soon as possible, and that greater mischief is done to the community by numerous appeals than by a wrong judgment occasionally being given, I think the highest Court of each Province ought to be the final Court of Appeals for the affairs of that Province. But the same objection that lies against the Supreme Court as a Court of Appeal in Provincial cases lies in a stronger degree against appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The hon. gentleman who proposes to withdraw provincial matters from the consideration of the Supreme Court ought to be consistent, and insist further on the withdrawal from the consideration of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. I am opposed to the postponement of this discussion, I am opposed to keeping this question in suspense, I am in favor of seeing a vote taken, and if a majority of this House are in favor of the abolition of the Supreme Court the sooner we know it the better; and if not, as I believe not, the question ought to be disposed of, and mischief ought not to be done by inviting opposition and arousing discontent in the country.

Amendment (Mr. Houde) to adjourn the debate, negatived on the following division:—

YEAS:

Messieurs

Abbott,	Hay,	Massue,
Allison,	Hesson,	Mongenais,
Baker,	Hooper,	Mousseau,
Barnard,	Houde,	O'Connor,
Beauchesne,	Hurteau,	Ogden,
Béchard,	Kaulbach,	Ouimet,
Benoît,	Kilvert,	Platt,
Bergeron,	Kranz,	Pope (Compton),
Bill,	Langevin,	Richey,
Bowell,	Lantier,	Robertson (Hamilton),
Brecken,	Laurier,	Rochester,
Caron,	Macdonald (Sir John),	Ross (Dundas),