

Obviously our general language must not preclude a sympathetic and realistic agreed solution for exceptional cases.

I might also mention that the goal of the international regulation of armed forces and armaments is specifically enshrined in our Charter itself. I refer, of course, to Article 26.

I come now to the third revision, which affects the text of sub-paragraph 1(c). Here the reference to regulation and limitation is omitted, at the request of the Soviet Delegation. It has seemed to us that, provided these important points are covered in sub-paragraph 1(a), and the over-riding principle of common sense and security remains embedded in the final phrase at the end of the paragraph 1, it is unnecessary to repeat here reference to regulation and limitation. Our Soviet colleague wished this reference omitted here; the Delegations of France, the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada preferred it in; but since, in the judgment of these four delegations, there could be no substantive danger involved, as all parts of the programme envisaged, in any case form a single coordinated whole, we accepted the omission here in order to reach agreement with our Soviet colleague.

Perhaps the most important of the revisions concerns operative paragraph 2. As we originally drafted it, the paragraph referred explicitly to the Anglo-French proposals alone, stating that they had been accepted by the Government of the Soviet Union as a basis for a disarmament convention. It then went on to refer in general terms to "other proposals within the Commission's terms of reference". This would, of course, cover the Soviet draft resolution of October 8, (Document A/C.1/750) as well as the United States working paper of May 25, 1954, and any other proposals that have been or may be submitted. The Soviet Delegation, however, asked that there be included a specific reference to the Soviet proposals, which as you know, Mr. Chairman, cover a number of points which, in our view and that of the other co-sponsors, differ quite substantially from them in certain important particulars. As the Soviet Delegation attach great importance to this point, we agreed to meet their desire for an explicit reference to the Soviet proposals, in listing the various proposals which the Disarmament Commission should take into account in its search for an acceptable solution of the disarmament problem: but in that case it seemed to us only reasonable to refer also, and equally explicitly, to the United States working paper of May 25, 1954. Naturally the Disarmament Commission is also to take into account any other proposals within the Commission's terms of reference - a provision, I need hardly point out, which refers not only to the past, but to any proposals which any delegation may put forward in the future.

I regret to say that the Soviet Delegation, after careful study, felt unable to co-sponsor the draft resolution if it included in paragraph 2 explicit reference to the United States working paper of May 25, which outlines, as members of this Committee know, the United States views on the rights, functions and powers of an International Control Organ.

The Soviet Delegation has several times made it clear that they are unable to accept the proposals put