

PANEL FOUR: FUTURE OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

This panel, the first on day two of the seminar, was moderated by Prof. Jan Geert Siccama (Dutch MOD), and featured as lead presenter Mr. Robert McDougall (DFAIT), who began by referring to a "pervasive sense of crisis in the field of nonproliferation, arms control, and disarmament" (NACD). Part of the problem resided in the fundamental tension between NACD, held to be "inherently international" in nature, and national security, which by definition put a premium on the efforts of single states, at least in the first instance. The tension mattered, because a sound national security strategy was one in which there was, or should be, close complementarity with NACD regimes; *mutatis mutandis*, the reverse held as well. Often, however, state decisionmakers lost sight of this complementarity.

Another source of the current crisis, Mr. McDougall continued, stemmed from suboptimal regional dynamics, in that while it was "axiomatic" that NACD could and did enhance prospects for regional peace and stability, it was often the case that a modicum of regional stability must first have been attained before conditions conducive to arms control could apply. What this suggested was that "we cannot expect countries to negotiate, join or sustain NACD commitments if they do not see such a step as reinforcing their national security."

An increasingly important issue confronting NACD, said Mr. McDougall, was the pace of technological development of weapons systems. New weapons were especially problematical (e.g., miniaturized nuclear "bunker busters," strategic missile defence, and spaced-based systems); these could be grouped under the rubric of "qualitative" or "vertical" proliferation. Then there was the more or less traditional problem of "quantitative" or "horizontal" proliferation, used to characterize the acquisition of established weapons systems by growing numbers of states or nonstate actors. Mr. McDougall explained that a technological race was also underway pitting those who would proliferate against those who would detect and check proliferation, so the story was not entirely a gloomy one.

In large measure, how the story ended would have much to do with geostrategic circumstances. Mr. McDougall identified three such circumstances: 1) the future of the US-Russia relationship; 2) the dual-edge ramifications of 11 September (meaning that while one consequence of the attacks had been to elevate the allure of nonproliferation in the campaign against terrorism, another consequence had been to render less attractive either arms control or disarmament, "always a tough sell in wartime"); and 3) the changing manner in which war was fought (with particular reference to the "Revolution in Military Affairs," or RMA).