

were also survivors of long repressive governments that had left their democratic movements weakened. Hence, they had little reason to be impressed *a priori* with the nationalist and military rhetoric behind so much of the security and nuclear weapons debate in their countries.

Related to this were those new priorities themselves, obvious enough in the Argentina and Brazil of the 1980s. Argentina could simply not afford a security policy any longer based on high levels of threat perception and other elements of classic geopolitical thinking in Latin America. It could not afford either a heavy defence budget or a foreign policy which rejected an active policy of seeking not only *détente* with neighbouring countries but real friendship. The dominant thinking as the decade ended, not only in the Southern Cone but throughout Latin America, was that only integration and a common front towards the outside world would allow the region the clout it needed. Such influence was required not only to get out of the debt crisis but also to advance to a more favourable position for future negotiations on the new world being designed and to leave behind the horrors of the "lost decade." Inherited security problems which held up progress on wider issues were not to be tolerated any longer and neither the discredited armed forces nor the now laughable nationalists could put up much resistance, especially after Argentine economic disaster in the late eighties.

The two countries, but especially Argentina, needed help from the major powers. Buenos Aires, especially under Menem, put reinserting the country into the West at the top of its foreign policy, and indeed security policy, agenda. Things that held up acceptance by the central powers were simply going to have to be jettisoned. And as we have seen, not just the nuclear side suffered on this score but also the central missile programme of the armed forces and the national arms industry as well. Thus the outside world had considerable leverage over the two countries but especially over Argentina. And as we have seen, the United States made it clear that progress on outstanding security matters like missiles and nuclear proliferation were the *sine qua non* for the status of important partner that Buenos Aires so desired. If Brasilia was less clear on this score, it was nonetheless working along many of the same lines.

The more powerful Brazilian armed forces were of course not under the same pressures as those of their southern neighbour. They were more able to resist change. But at the same time civilian governments could point increasingly clearly to progress in the bilateral relationship, overall and even in defence and nuclear terms, as well as to the obvious Argentine acceptance of Brazilian predominance regionally, as ways to convince the armed forces that times had indeed changed and that Brazil could finally put down its guard at least to a sufficient extent to allow the integration and collaboration experiment a chance.

In South Asia, few of these circumstances exist. While democracy shows great robustness in India, it is much weaker in Pakistan. And it must be said that nuclear weapons were rarely debated in the Southern Cone of South America. Nationalist opinion and the armed forces wanted them so when those currents were dominant, such programmes made progress. In India, with time, the debate on nuclear weapons for the country garnered considerable public interest, especially on occasions when India was, in nationalists' view, being pilloried by the West. On the other hand, as