

EO provided security and information to a major international aid agency that has since kept quiet to avoid the wrath of its donors.²⁹ Similarly, despite the need and advice from many UN personnel to take the private route, Kofi Annan and other Security Council members eventually balked at the idea of employing DSL to separate fighters from refugees in the Rwandan refugee camps in Goma. For Annan, "...the world may not be ready to privatize peace".³⁰

This is not to say that PSCs do not strive to attain this legitimacy. Some companies have put forth their own proposals for regulation.³¹ Also, DSL, which does not provide top cover, but does train militaries in the midst of conflicts and guard humanitarian compounds and convoys, states that it adheres to Red Cross/NGO Codes of Conduct.³² As well, many of the firms even provide training in international humanitarian law. As for conduct on the ground, officials such as the head of Sandline International, Timothy Spicer, go to great length to explain that their companies follow human rights and humanitarian law religiously for the sake of reputation and repeat clients, let alone for enhanced legitimacy: "We like to conduct professional service in line with the Geneva Convention, international law and behavioural standards one would expect from a disciplined, organised and properly constituted military force".³³ In support of this stance, the ICRC believes that there is no reason to assume that the behaviour of private security would be worse than that of other actors.³⁴ To further this end, PSCs such as Sandline International and EO have acted *outside* their contractual obligations to client states to perform "humanitarian" activities. This has included such diverse activities as the repatriation of child soldiers, escorting humanitarian convoys, ferrying Sierra Leone's football team to the African All Nations Cup, and providing logistics, intelligence, and aerial evacuations for NGO personnel.³⁵ As a sign of progress in regards to legitimacy for PSCs that provide top cover and perhaps even for the service itself, if not an indication of operational schizophrenia within the United Nations system, PSCs such as Sandline International are now listed on the United Nations Supply Database for United Nations and United Nations related organizations.

However in the final analysis, humanitarians cannot rely on private security to provide top cover and other related spinoff benefits. On one level, for analysts of privatization, simple economic logic dictates that a profit-seeker cannot be expected "to attend at any significant cost to dimensions of value other than those specified in the contract".³⁶ In other words, while PSCs that provide top cover can act, for lack of a better term, as good corporate citizens with respect to

²⁹ Cited in Kirsten Sellars, "Old dogs of war learn new tricks," New Statesman (25 April 1997), p. 24.

³⁰ Cited in Michele Griffin, "Blue Helmet Blues: Assessing the Trend Towards 'Subcontracting' UN Peace Operations," Security Dialogue 30 (Number 1), p. 47.

³¹ See <http://www.sandline.com>.

³² Correspondence, James Fennell, Defense Systems Limited, 7 April 2000.

³³ Cited in Sellars, "Old dogs of war learn new tricks," p. 24.

³⁴ Sandoz, "Privatisation of Security".

³⁵ Good corporate citizenship was also reportedly done by Lifeguard. Bernie McCabe indicates that Lifeguard promoted "collateral benefit" which had both passive and active components. On the passive side, the mere presence of the firm provided a degree of stability for the local populace. On the active side, Lifeguard provided, free of charge, such services as food, medicine, and water distribution. Interview, 10 April 2000.

³⁶ John D. Donahue, The Privatization Decision: Public Ends, Private Means (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1989), p. 80.