

this reason Table 4, unlike the other tables, does not attempt to illustrate a post-reduction force structure. Although the precise nature of this proposal remains to be determined, the following observations illustrate the dilemmas. First, carrier based aircraft add significantly to American LRTNF, and would seriously skew the reduction proportions if they were included. It is possible that, although they might be included at the outset of a negotiation, they would be dropped rather quickly if progress were possible without their inclusion.

Table 4

<u>US Forces with Present LRTNF<sup>28</sup></u>		
	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Warheads</u>
ICBMs	1,024	2,124
SLBMs	648	5,760
Bombers	324	3,642
	(1,996)	11,526
P II currently deployed	108	108
GLCM currently deployed	128	128
<u>Incremental total</u>	<u>2,232</u>	
Fighter Bombers (based in Europe)	390	780
<u>Incremental total</u>	<u>2,622</u>	
Carrier-based bombers	900 (?)	1,800
<u>Total</u>	<u>3,522</u>	<u>14,342</u>
<u>After 50% cut</u>		
<u>Launchers</u> (not including carrier forces)	1,761	<u>Warhead ceiling</u> 6,000

Second, even if one were to set aside the political and alliance issues

<sup>28</sup> Marshall Akhromeyov stated that the US has 2210 strategic launchers. Since it is not clear precisely what launchers are included in his figure, the above figures are based on standard Western sources. However, the similarity in figures suggests that the launcher types cited above are those included in the Soviet figures