

strife and possible military competition which could de-rail progress, and even create chaos and carnage again in Europe and the world.

What, then, are the *security* threats, and the most appropriate responses? Whether we want to believe it or not, the first threat is still the classic danger of unbalanced military power. As Robert Schuman said during the ratification debate of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949,

The feeling of insecurity is not always due to a defined threat, a visibly prepared aggression. The mere imbalance of forces that is maintained by the stronger and not compensated for by serious international guarantees in favour of the weaker, suffices to create insecurity.⁸

Arms Reduction and Arms Control

In the fields of arms control and arms reduction, 1990 and 1991 have probably been the most encouraging years in history and yet, paradoxically, events have moved so far and so fast that these positive trends have been overshadowed, and may in some real senses have been left behind. We have seen the massive conventional forces reductions agreed in November 1990, and confirmed in June 1991 with the resolution of some final disputes; the July 1991 signature of the START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) agreement which for the first time actually cuts strategic nuclear weapons; and some progress on a number of other longstanding negotiations on arms limitations and reductions. By September 1991, however, President Bush unilaterally announced sweeping cuts in American nuclear arsenals and readiness, and one week later President Gorbachev more than reciprocated with similar measures and further offers of his own.

The dramatic break from the tradition of laboriously negotiated arms control agreements reflected the virtual elimination of the political confrontation between East and West, but equally it reflected a sense of urgent concern about some new problems. Suddenly, the key concerns in arms control have shifted from an approach of managing an intricate relationship of deterrence between heavily armed adversaries, to one of literally *controlling* and preferably eliminating weapons which might otherwise fall into unpredicted and unpredictable hands. The shift of approach to rapid arms cuts was too late to avert a set of very serious concerns about the management of nuclear and other forces as the Soviet Union finally crumbled. It is by no means clear how past agreements will be implemented and verified under these radically new conditions.