

United States and the Soviet Union. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), from 1973 to 1975, resulted in the Helsinki Final Act which included limited CBMs. Following the CSCE were two review conferences, one in Belgrade from 1977 to 1978, and one in Madrid from 1980 to 1983.* The Stockholm negotiations themselves were the direct result of the Helsinki process and its two review conferences.

As steps toward regulating the use of military force, CBMs have assumed significance in the study and pursuit of arms control today. This importance is bound to increase as the nations involved in the CSCE process negotiate further CBMs to enhance the steps agreed to in Stockholm, a process that began in Vienna in mid-1988.¹ But what *are* CBMs, what are their purposes, and how have they been pursued? The following discussion examines these questions, surveys the records of compliance with the Helsinki and Stockholm Agreements, and illustrates how CBMs have influenced European security in the past fifteen years.

WHAT IS A CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURE?

Generally speaking, CBMs comprise agreements between two or more nations which enhance the predictability of routine military activities. The more advanced forms can, in addition, establish limitations on the use of military forces, set up mechanisms designed to alleviate perceived threats, or a combination of the two.² These measures can, of course, be implemented unilaterally. Confidence-building can be described as 'operational' arms control as opposed to the 'structural' arms control of such negotiations as the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) or the talks on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). In 'structural' arms control, the weapons or forces themselves are limited in some quantitative or qualitative manner.

The main purpose of CBMs in Europe is to lessen the possibility of a surprise attack using conventional forces. In addition, as described by Johan Jorgen Holst and Karen Alette Melander, another role of CBMs in Europe is "the communication of credible evidence of the absence of feared threats." They added that another major objective of CBMs was "to provide reassurance to the rest of the states in Europe." The implemented measures "should do this by reducing uncertainties and by constraining opportunities for exerting pressure through military activity." In an ideal situation, "confidence would be enhanced to the extent that the option of surprise military action receded into the background."³

*At the conclusion of the Madrid Review Conference, the confidence-building measures were strengthened to the extent that they are now referred to as confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs). For the purpose of clarity in this paper, however, CBMs will be used throughout.

The Helsinki Final Act recognized the need for CBMs:

... to contribute to reducing the dangers of armed conflict and of misunderstanding and miscalculation of military activities which could give rise to apprehension, particularly in a situation where the participating States lack clear and timely information about the nature of such activities ...⁴

THE HELSINKI ACCORDS

The Helsinki Accords were negotiated by the 35-nation Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) between 3 July 1973 and 1 August 1975. The main body of the resulting document, called the Final Act, was divided into three 'baskets': 'basket one' for questions related to security, 'basket two' for economic and technological issues, and 'basket three' dealing with humanitarian concerns.⁵

The second part of 'basket one', the Document on Confidence-Building Measures and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament, addressed the participants' desire to eliminate causes of tension and establish codes of conduct to contribute to the strengthening of peace and security in the world. By adopting specific measures to fulfil this desire, the signatories institutionalized a moderate yet historically significant system of multilateral CBMs.

The Helsinki Confidence-Building Measures

The CBM document was divided into three sections. The first, dealing with prior notification of major military manoeuvres and related items, was the most significant. The second section dealt with questions relating to disarmament, while the third contained general considerations.

In the first section, the agreed measures fell into two basic categories: notification of, and observation of, manoeuvres. The signatories agreed to notify all other participants of major military manoeuvres involving more than 25,000 troops. Notification applied to land forces independently or in any combination with air and naval forces. Amphibious and airborne troops were included in the measure by means of a broad interpretation of the word, 'troop'. The Accords also invited participants to notify voluntarily manoeuvres under the 25,000 troop level.

Notification was required for any manoeuvre held on the territory of a participating state in Europe, including adjoining sea and airspace where applicable. In the cases of Turkey and the Soviet Union, whose territories extend beyond Europe, notification was required only if the manoeuvre took place in an area within 250 kilometres of another participating European state, unless that space also faced a non-participating state. Notification must be given 21 days or more in advance of the manoeuvre, or as