

The uncertainty which persists concerning the probable status of Cambodia is made up for by the fact that all the proposals for a settlement, including the four-point plan put forward by the UN Secretary General Pérez de Cuellar,¹²⁵ agree on the following points:

- the need for national reconciliation between all the opposing groups of Khmers;
- the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops;
- the holding of free elections under foreign supervision;
- the holding of an international conference to guarantee the agreement and the independence of Cambodia.

On the other hand, and this is crucial if any constructive negotiations are to get underway, there is still disagreement concerning the order in which these different procedures should take place. While the CGDK sticks to its eight-point plan which calls for the partial withdrawal of the Vietnamese troops as a first step, to be followed by the formation of a government of national reconciliation, Vietnam, on the other hand, demands that the formation of a quadripartite government must precede any withdrawal of its troops. There is also disagreement concerning the setting up of a quadripartite government since the CGDK wants to make sure that the PRK will not be able to organize and control the elections by welcoming opposition individuals and groups who return — apart from Pol Pot and his close associates — to take part in the process of national reconstruction.¹²⁶

The CGDK responds to that by suggesting that all Cambodians should be reconciled: “No one is rejected regardless of the person’s past or political tendency. No one is asked to surrender to anyone. Vietnam proposes a so-called national reconciliation respecting this or that individual in an attempt to split or weaken Cambodian national resistance forces.”¹²⁷

¹²⁵ *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 16 July 1987, page 12.

¹²⁶ *FBIS-EAS* 87-196, 9 October 1987, page 31.

¹²⁷ *FBIS-EAS* 87-211, 2 November 1987, page 38.