

what we mean by verification. No sensible Government enters into those international contracts known as treaties unless it can ascertain — or verify — that it is getting what it contracted for.

Lack of effective verification and compliance mechanisms has been a major obstacle to achieving a true and effective ban on these weapons.

As I mentioned at the beginning, the technical similarities between chemical weapons production facilities and commercial production facilities, the similarity between chemical weapons agents and chemicals for peaceful uses, and the similarity between chemical munitions and conventional munitions makes discrimination impossible without very, very close observation.

And, perhaps most importantly, strict verification is needed to protect those who do not possess chemical weapons, or are willing to give them up, from those who might maintain possession surreptitiously.

The goal of our proposal is a treaty to require States to declare the sizes and locations of their chemical weapons stocks and their production facilities, to destroy the stocks and facilities and to forswear creating any new chemical weapons.

If they are to sign such a contract, States must have confidence, in particular, that they can know:

First, that all stocks have been destroyed;

Second, that all declared production facilities have been destroyed;

Third, that the declared stocks really do constitute all the stocks;

And fourthly, that the declared facilities are all the facilities.

Without such firm assurance we cannot -- and I think everybody here knows this -- we cannot claim to have banned chemical weapons. In this regard, the United States Government has taken note of the Soviet Union's announced willingness to consider accepting the continuous stationing of international inspection teams at the locations where declared stockpiles are to be destroyed, and we welcome that.

We are encouraged by this recognition of the indispensability of on-site inspection, a matter that was tabled right here in this room, I think by Ambassador Issraelyan. The Soviet Union's announcement has advanced the negotiations toward establishing confidence in the first of the four critical requirements, that is, that all declared stocks be destroyed.

To address the second of the four criteria -- that all declared production facilities be destroyed -- we propose a similar continuous, on-site monitoring and periodic inspection.

The verification difficulties inherent in the problem of undeclared sites -- determining that there are no hidden stocks and no clandestine production facilities -- remain our most formidable challenge. It is formidable because the problem of undeclared sites can be resolved only if States commit themselves to a new, but absolutely necessary degree of openness.

Let us face reality. Chemical weapons are not difficult to hide and are not difficult to produce in a clandestine manner. Many States have the capacity to do this. We can rid the world of these weapons only if we all make it difficult for anyone, for ourselves to do such things without detection.

The opportunity for undetected violations is the undoing of arms control. If that opportunity persists, it would render whatever chemical weapons ban we conclude illusory and really would set back the cause of peace.

And so, for that reason, the United States Government is putting forward the unprecedented "open invitation" verification proposal to which I referred earlier. As part of a chemical weapons ban, the United States is willing to join other parties in a mutual obligation to open for international inspection on short notice all of its military or government-owned or government-controlled facilities.