

export revolution should understand that such activity carries high risks of unacceptable costs.

But the concept of proportionality should not be ignored in the effort to deter. Some forms of support of revolutionary activity are less noxious than others; rhetorical support of revolution in another state is less significant than material involvement in that revolution; the provision of sanctuary is less significant than the provision of troops. Responses to the "revolutionary internationalism" of Cuba and Nicaragua should focus on deterring them from direct military involvement (provision of arms and personnel).

It should be made clear that such responses are designed to deal with these revolutionary activities as and when they occur. They should not take on the character of a permanent and unremitting crusade to destroy the government concerned. Regimes, such as that of Nicaragua, when faced with disproportionate responses of this type, not unwisely conclude that their survival is at stake and seek assistance wherever it may be found.

Negative deterrent policies should, moreover, be accompanied by the prospect of reward for compliance with US wishes, both in domestic and in foreign policy. In particular, the United States should not deny itself the considerable leverage which it derives from its position as the preponderant economic power in the region. Doing so may merely accelerate trends which the United States opposes, or may perpetuate lines of policy which the Americans consider noxious. To cite an example referred to above, the United States ostensibly cancelled aid to Nicaragua in 1981 as a result of Nicaraguan assistance to the Salvadoran guerrillas. But when the Nicaraguans moderated their behaviour, the United States failed to respond by removing the sanction. The lesson that the Sandinistas drew from this experience was presumably that they were damned if they did comply and damned if they didn't. The apparent unwillingness of the United States to engage in a substantive dialogue on regional issues with the Nicaraguans (despite Nicaraguan offers to include their relations with the FMLN in the discussions), and US diffidence towards the Contadora initiatives presumably reinforce this conclusion. The United States gains little either in its relations with Nicaragua or in its regional diplomatic standing from this stubborn refusal to moderate its pressure in the face of Nicaraguan willingness to compromise. In their domestic policy, emergent radical regimes are likely to aim at some measure of internal transformation which will probably be detrimental to the established private sector, and are likely to make some