

TO BE CAUSING INJURY, AND THOSE (MAINLY AMONG THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES BUT WITH SOME SUPPORT FROM, FOR EXAMPLE, CANADA AND JAPAN) WHO FEAR ANY SUCH RELAXATION OF THE RULES (WHICH NOW CALL FOR ACTION AGAINST SUCH IMPORTS FROM ALL SOURCES) WOULD BE ALMOST CONTINUOUSLY AIMED AT THEM. THE JURY IS STILL OUT ON WHETHER THE GAP BETWEEN THESE POSITIONS CAN BE SPANNED AND A FURTHER EFFORT IS ABOUT TO BE MADE IN GENEVA TO DETERMINE IF AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED. OTHERWISE, THIS PIECE OF "UNFINISHED BUSINESS" SEEMS CERTAIN TO BE CARRIED OVER FOR PRIORITY ATTENTION IN GATT'S POST-MTN WORK SCHEDULE.

EXCEPT FOR ANTI-DUMPING WHERE LIMITED MODIFICATIONS TO THE EXISTING 1967 CODE WERE AGREED, THE NON-TARIFF MEASURE AGREEMENTS BROKE NEW AND POTENTIALLY VERY FERTILE GROUND. IN MANY CASES, IN ORDER TO ADDRESS THE COMPLEX TRADE IMPLICATIONS OF NON-TARIFF MEASURES, THE SOLUTIONS PROPOSED PROVED, NOT SURPRISINGLY, ALSO TO BE COMPLICATED.

CANADA AND THE CANADIAN NEGOTIATORS PLAYED A CREATIVE ROLE IN THIS AREA OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING DUTIES, CANADA AND THE EEC HAD A JOINT INTEREST IN THE UNITED STATES AGREEING TO CEASE LEVYING COUNTERVAILING DUTIES ON SUBSIDIZED DUTIABLE IMPORTS UNTIL IT HAD FIRST BEEN DEMONSTRATED, IN ACCORDANCE WITH GATT REQUIREMENTS, THAT ITS INDUSTRY HAD SUFFERED INJURY. THE FACT THAT THE EEC AND CANADA WERE ABLE TO EXERT THIS COMBINED PRESSURE WENT A LONG WAY TOWARDS