

latter to make themselves terrible even to strangers. The rules of morality will not suffer us to promote the dearest interest by falsehood; the maxims of war applaud it when employed in the destruction of others." But enough. If the abominations of war are right, what deed under the sun is wrong? If christianity sanctions the atrocities of the embattled plain, what is it better than paganism? And may we not boldly say with the late missionary Ward, Either our religion is a fable, or war is wrong?

But we presume that Marmion will readily admit that every species of war confessedly does what the New Testament forbids and condemns—he is too intelligent not to know that every form of the custom is a direct violation of its precepts. It can exist only by the very feelings and deeds here prohibited in terms too plain to be misunderstood, or denied. And hence he will not look in the face, the "collection" of Holy Scripture upon which much of our case depends." In this, our friend will permit us to say that we think, as an advocate for war, he is highly to be commended. Some have tried to justify the unchristian practices of war by an appeal to the religion of the blessed Jesus. Marmion, however, has not tried to unite Christ with Belial! He has not attempted to prove that a square is a circle, or that north is south! It is true our antagonist hints that the Old Testament would make an ample *text-book* for his purpose. But it will be time enough to reply to any Old Testament proofs when they are produced: in the meantime we may remind Marmion that he is not addressing a Jew but a Christian, and that we should think ourselves sadly prepared to enter into a disputation on the war-question, if we could not show that all modern wars were sinful from most of the wars of the Jews recorded in the Bible. With equal facility we fancy we could prove that polygamy, concubinage, and slavery were as lawful for christians by the Old Testament, as that war was proper for the followers of the Son of God.

But "the Bible was never intended as a code of international law—the passages of Scripture quoted are very well for individuals, but they lose all their force and application when nations are the subject of conversation." Such as we understand it, is the substance of the argument of Marmion. It is certain that the precepts we have introduced are addressed to individuals, to every individual in every nation of Christendom—and it is undeniably true that it is the duty of individual christians to obey them—and to obey them uniformly, and on every occasion. But if a nation consists of individuals, each of whom, from the Monarch down to the lowest rank, is under the moral government of Christ, how can any body or class of these individuals claim an exemption from a law which is binding upon each of them, both detached, and in connexion with their fellow creatures? Does Marmion mean to say that those *fundamental* rules of conduct, which are given to guide every man in his own walk through life, may be deserted as soon as he unites with others, and acts in a corporate capacity? If so, the plain consequence of his system will be this—that national crimes of every description might be committed without entailing any national guilt, and without any real infraction of the revealed will of God.

Or does Marmion intend to assert that the rulers of a nation have authority to suspend at pleasure the requirements and prohibitions of Heaven, either in relation to themselves or their subjects? Can they, by a *vote*, absolve moral beings from their obligations to "love one another?" Can the fallible ruler of a nation make it the *duty* of their subjects to hate and murder innocent brethren of another country? Can a war manifesto so far supersede the Divine authority, as to make it the duty of a christian to act the part of a mortal enemy towards the subjects of another government? Can the decree of an earthly ruler absolve his subjects from their obligations to obey the great command—"Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself?" If so, the assumption of this principle arrogates for rulers, a *Supremacy*, over the SUPREME BEING, and makes his laws responsible to their own? It would follow too that subjects are not responsible for the injuries which they do in time of war, if done by the order of their rulers. On this principle the most vile and malignant passions of soldiers may be indulged, in the hope of impunity at the bar of God.

Strange as it may appear, however, many men, while they order the course of their domestic lives by the precepts of Christianity, forget or deny the application of the same precepts to their duty as citizens of the world. They admit the propriety of the pacific injunctions of Jesus when applied only to individuals, or to christians in their individual capacity, but deny their propriety when applied to professing christian states or political bodies. Yet of what are communities composed but individuals? What is the national feeling and the national conduct, but the aggregate of feeling and conduct which belong to individuals? By whom is the multitude controlled, and the tide of battle poured along, if not by individuals? But by what authority is the sense of Scripture restrained or applied in this particular way? *By the authority of Christ?* No. But we know of no other authority competent to establish such a restriction. And hence it would seem a sufficient answer, to meet the assertion of Marmion with assertion. To the objection we have now noticed, we find the distinguished Dr. Chalmers does not think it worth his while, to level against it any thing in the shape of argument. And hence without any mincing of the matter, he boldly asserts—"If forbearance be the virtue of an individual, forbearance is also the virtue of a nation: If

it be incumbent on men in honor to prefer each other, it is incumbent on the very largest societies of men, through the constituted organ of their government to do the same. If it be the glory of a man, to defer his anger, and to pass over a transgression, that nation mistakes its glory which is so feelingly alive to the slightest insult. If it be the magnanimity of an injured man to abstain from vengeance, then that is the magnanimous nation, which, recoiling from violence and from blood, will do no more than send its christian embassy, and prefer its mild and impressive remonstrance." And so the venerable Clarkson, the noble abolitionist, meets the question. He does not seem to think that it needs any argument to demolish it. "Will it be alleged," he asks, "that those doctrines which prohibit the resentment of private injuries, are inapplicable to the case of public wrongs? What! does the law of God forbid the murder of an individual, and does it license the murder of thousands? Does it bar the indulgence of angry passions against an *offending neighbor*, and does it authorize feelings of hatred, deeds of cruelty towards unoffending multitudes? Or, can public authority alter the nature of right and wrong?" But we have more respect for Marmion than to treat him in so cavalier a manner. We beg his candid attention to the following views.

If Marmion should say that an act which would be a sin in an individual would be no sin in a nation, we should like him to inform us what amount of numbers constitutes a nation. Were Robinson Crusoe and his man Friday a nation? If not how populous must the island become before their numbers would sanction sin? San Marino, a republic in Europe, has been called a nation for many centuries; and yet its numbers have not exceeded seven thousand. Can seven thousand persons alter the nature of right and wrong? Now we must confess, the objection to us appears futile until the precise number to which a family, a tribe, or a gang must arrive, before they can be called a nation, shall be determined on.

We ask Marmion to consider another argument, one more frequently used by the advocates of Peace. Let us look back to the origin of society. Suppose a family like that of Noah, to commence the settlement of a country. They multiply into a number of distinct families. Then in the course of years they become so numerous as to form distinct governments. In any stage of their progress, unfortunate disputes might arise by the imprudence, the avarice, or the ambition of individuals. Now at what period would it be proper to introduce the custom of deciding controversies by the edge of the sword, or an appeal to arms? Might this be done when the families had increased to ten? Who would not be shocked at the madness of introducing such a custom under such circumstances? Might it then with more propriety be done when the families had multiplied to fifty, or to a thousand, or ten thousand? The greater the number, the greater the danger, the greater the carnage and calamity. Besides, what reason can be given, why this mode of deciding controversies would not be as proper when there were but ten families, as when there were ten thousand? And why might not two individuals thus decide disputes, as well as two nations? Perhaps Marmion will admit that the custom could not be honorably introduced, until they separated, and formed two or more distinct governments. But would this change of circumstances dissolve their ties as brethren, and their obligations as accountable beings? Would the organization of distinct governments confer a right on rulers to appeal to arms for the settlement of controversies? Is it not manifest, that no period can be assigned, at which the introduction of such a custom would not be absolute murder? And shall a custom which must have been murderous at its commencement, be now upheld as necessary and honorable?

Another mode of reasoning, employed by those who consider all war as sinful, on the present topic, we have always considered to be an ample and satisfactory answer. The answer is to be found in the arrangements and methods of reasoning, adopted in those Treatises, which relate to the duties and intercourse of nations. In all complete Treatises on the Law of Nations, we find the distinction, into the Natural and Conventional Law. The natural law of nations is that portion of the Law of Nations, which is founded in nature. In other words, the whole reasoning, running through this part of international law, is based upon the single principle, that, as nations are composed of individuals, whatever is right or wrong in individuals, is also right or wrong in nations, acting under similar circumstances. The natural reasoning and conscience of man, judging as to what is right or wrong in his own individual conduct, is the standard, which the writer on this portion of the Law of Nations constantly refers to, in attempting to prescribe the path of international action. But since the introduction of the Gospel, men are placed under a new dispensation, superadded to, and far above that of mere unaided nature. If there are some things which are permitted by the light of nature, but are forbidden by the Gospel, no one can doubt that their conduct in their individual capacity is now to be regulated, not by the permission of nature, but by the prohibition of Revelation. Now what we claim is, the right to reason and to apply principles of action, in the same way in which writers on the Law of Nations have always reasoned and applied principles of action. They have reasoned from individuals to nations, and have applied to nations principles of action, which they claimed to be just and obligatory in the case of individuals.

Now in our argument against war we act precisely in the same way. We endeavour to ascertain what under the Gospel are the duties binding upon individuals, and from individuals we ascend to those communities and nations, which these individuals have formed by associating with each other.

But we need not add 'line upon line' on this part of our subject. We but *follow Marmion* when we argue that the principles of the Gospel binding upon men in their individual capacity, are also binding upon them in their social capacity. Marmion does the very thing which he disallows in us. He wonders we do not distinguish between the duties of individuals and those of nations, when he forgets to make the distinction himself! What means his fictitious *Pirate case*—a case

"Whose lightest word  
Would harrow up thy soul; freeze thy young blood;  
Make thy two eyes, like stars, start from their spheres,  
And each particular hair to stand on end,  
Like quills upon the fretful porcupine.  
But this eternal blazon must not be—"

No, no. *Must not be*, when it comes from one who denies the applicability of all such cases to the decision of the question. But Marmion wishes to draw an *important principle* from the *Pirate case*—what principle? The principle that if it be right for one hundred individuals to resist unto death fifty pirates, it is right for a nation to resist unto death an invading army! And so our friend commits the very error which excites his wonder with respect to us. We do not refer to the inconsistency of Marmion in the spirit of triumph. It is the common error of all the defenders of war. They begin by asserting that nations are not to be governed by the same fundamental rules as individuals, and end by attempting to prove that national war is right from the duties of individuals. They are constantly asking "What would you do if assailed by an assassin—or what must be done if christians are attacked by savage hordes of brutal monsters of iniquity?" appealing to our animal feelings, rather than to our judgment, and thus attempting to justify nations by extreme cases applicable to individuals, while the whole force of their argument rests on the assumption, that what would be sin in an individual, would be right in a nation.

We hope we have now satisfactorily shown that the precepts of *loving our enemies, doing good to them that hate us, overcoming evil with good*, and a hundred other passages in the gospel of a like nature apply to nations as well as to individuals. The spirit of all war is directly opposite to these precepts. Look at the sinful qualities which have been exemplified in all wars not expressly commanded by God and sanctioned by miracles, and then glance over the pacific injunctions of christianity. Now we say, these things are contrary one to the other; or in other words, that all war is contrary to the spirit of the Gospel. David Hume, a prince amidst infidels, with his keen eye saw the bearings of the gospel on war. And he gives us to understand, that he despised the gospel because it inculcated meekness, and because it would not permit its adherents to fight for their rights. Happy had it been for the world, if christian nations had seen the truth with half the clearness of that arch foe of divine revelation. We hope to take up the argument from civil government in favor of war, and also to notice the extreme cases which Marmion has culled out of a fruitful imagination in our succeeding number. Like the lions which Pilgrim encountered on the hill of Difficulty, they will be found on a near approach, to be chained and harmless; and none but a timorous man, who lacks faith, will be frightened at them, or be prevented from walking in the path of duty, though it may be difficult, or even dangerous. It is better to die than to sin. With Marmion, the question seems to be, not so much whether all war be inconsistent with the gospel, as whether it be not expedient sometimes to bend the gospel to our circumstances, when our own safety and that of our wives, children, and country require it? We say No.

April 10.

THE EDITOR.

For News, etc., we refer our readers to the third page.

## ANNUALS FOR 1839.

A. & W. MACKINLAY have received per the CLTO, from Liverpool, the following ANNUALS, viz.  
Friendship's Offering,  
Forget Me Not,  
The Keepsake,  
The Book of Beauty,  
The Oriental Annual.

LIKEWISE. The third number of Petley's Illustrations of Nova Scotia, containing the following views:

View of the Cobequid Mountains,  
" Fredericton, N. B.  
" Windsor from the Barracks,  
" Stream, near the Grand Lake,  
" Indian of the Mic Mac Tribe,

With an additional view to be given gratis to all those who subscribed for the first two numbers. 4w  
March 5.

## TO BE SOLD AT PRIVATE SALE.

THE PROPERTY owned by Joseph Hawkins, situated in Upper Water Street, adjoining Mr. Davis's, butcher. For particulars apply to J. Hawkins.  
April 5.