

mediate action to do away with any reason for complaint of abuse by: 1st. Superannuation on a fair basis of those no longer able to perform official duties. 2nd. Transferring to suitable positions those who should be transferred in the interests of efficiency; and 3rd. Discharging forthwith from the service those who will not or cannot give service equivalent to the salaries they demand.

The Civil Service themselves recommend that this should be done. Many of them realize that one of the burdens pressing upon them is carrying the load of the inefficient and incapable servant. He is not doing his work, but is drawing his pay, and is thus an obstacle to other servants being paid what, perhaps, they should receive. In addition to that—I am very briefly referring to these matters—in the report of transmission which accompanies the classification of the Civil Service made by the experts who have had this matter in charge, reference is made on the question and at page 52 these statements are made:

The process of removal may be considered as the reverse of the process of appointment, and the same principles apply. To reiterate the statement so often made in this report, the problem is to man the organization with employees who have the ability to do the work of the positions they are to occupy and who will actually apply such ability in an efficient manner. The removal of an employee is therefore called for when it develops that he lacks (1) the ability to fill his place, or (2) the will to render the standard of service demanded.

Removal on the grounds of unfitness during the probation period is usually nothing more or less than a rectification of a mistake made at the time of the selection of the employee. Such removals should be easy.

A removal made after the probationary period has been successfully completed will ordinarily be based on grounds of inefficiency rather than unfitness—on lack of effort rather than lack of skill. A removal under these circumstances is one of the forms of punishment to avoid which an employee is impelled to apply himself to his duties.

It is commonly looked upon as the only really effective weapon at the disposal of the managing officer for the enforcement of disciplinary regulations—that is, the regulations that prescribe the time and place at which, and the manner in which, the employee is to perform his duty. To propose to limit in any way the department head in the exercise of the discharging power may appear to be a radical suggestion. Any sound employment policy under centralized control is, however, based on the theory that the skill and effort of employees are the assets with which the service does business and belong to the service. With this idea in mind it does not appear unreasonable that the service, through its employment authorities, should demand some evidence that these assets are not being needlessly squandered through the indiscriminate discharge of employees whose selection and training have cost the public much.

And they conclude this paragraph by saying:

While it is to be considered a breach of duty for the department head to discharge an employee for any reason except unfitness, inefficiency, or insubordination, it should be looked upon as just as grave a breach for him to fail to remove an employee who is manifestly unfit and inefficient.

Now, I cannot understand that any business man would dispute that argument. I cannot understand any business man who would be willing to engage his employees with his hands so tied that he would not be permitted to dismiss one of them when he saw that that employee was not giving satisfactory service. And yet that is practically the condition in our Civil Service. As I said, I do not intend moving a formal amendment, but I would urge on the minister having this matter in charge to see if some scheme cannot be evolved and incorporated in the Bill which will make dismissals from the service easier. There are inefficient in the service. Why not let us get rid of these inefficient and relieve the service of the inefficiency which is produced by them? I do hope that something will be done along these lines, so that at this time when we are doing so much in order to raise the standard of the Civil Service we will not omit this most necessary procedure.

Mr. MOWAT: The matter raised by the hon. and gallant member for Fort William (Mr. Manion) is left in a somewhat unsatisfactory state. My hon. friend made a very good attempt to get before the House the object of his desire, but he is met with a very formidable obstruction in the British North America Act, which prevents a private member moving any motion involving expenditure. But it seems to me that, in view of the statement of the minister, that while he does not himself approve of the matter, yet he would not object to having the sense of the House taken on it, he might bring in a resolution pro forma, so to speak, in order to allow that matter to be decided upon the third reading of this Bill. Otherwise hon. members will not be able to give that expression of opinion which the minister said he was willing to take.

Mr. HOCKEN: I want to acknowledge the courtesy of the chairman of the commission in providing me with a somewhat comprehensive statement showing why there is a difference in the salaries of the supervisors at the Printing Bureau. This statement on the face of it is intended to prove that a supervisor of compositors should get \$200 a year more than a supervisor of pressmen. I find that the Civil Service Commission, in its wisdom and in its extravagance, ap-