

that an eventual treaty should reflect a balance of obligations and responsibilities as between the nuclear and non-nuclear countries and should lead to wider measures of arms control and general and complete disarmament. I think it fair to say that their point of view has been accepted by the other members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. While the Canadian delegation attaches the utmost importance to the early conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty, we regard it as only the first of many measures designed to stem the nuclear arms race and bring us closer to our objective of general and complete disarmament. We welcome what Mr. Federenko said, "As it works for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Government does not in any way strive to consolidate and perpetuate the so-called nuclear monopoly of the nuclear powers. Such an agreement cannot and must not be regarded as an end in itself; it should be regarded only as a step towards the prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons." (A/C.1/PV1431, p.11). And Mr. Goldberg said essentially the same thing as recorded on A/C.1/PV1431, p.32.

The Canadian Government stands firmly committed to its long-established policy not to produce nuclear weapons, which has been well within our technical ability for many years. We are also committed to the conclusion of a universal non-proliferation treaty as the most urgent arms control measure before the international community. There is considerable common ground between the USA and the USSR draft treaties now on the table. We believe they are close enough in object and scope that we can reasonably expect conclusive negotiations on the substance of a treaty. As far as the substance is concerned, we wish to see a formula which would ensure that the nations possessing nuclear weapons--or nuclear powers--be limited to the existing five and that the control of nuclear weapons not be allowed to pass to other countries. We are satisfied that this can be done without interfering with legitimate defensive arrangements of alliances.

We think it important that a treaty include an effective provision for verifying that obligations undertaken are observed. Article III of the present USA draft treaty, which would call upon all signatories "to cooperate in facilitating the application of the IAEA or equivalent international safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear activities" would contribute both to the effective working of a non-proliferation treaty and the strengthening of the international safeguards system. If provision were also made for the application of international safeguards on a mandatory basis to all foreign transfers of fissile materials, as is indeed already the policy of the Canadian Government, a safeguards article would itself become an effective obstacle to further proliferation.