would have had them earlier if economic conditions had been more favourable. (3) It is also perhaps true that the total numbers of families who have one, two and three children are fairly stable, although there are fewer of them than before the 1914-18 war. (4) There is no evidence of any change in the continuous long-term reduction in the numbers of large families. In Canada where there is still a fair proportion of very large families, this trend is especially important.

One qualification is necessary to the view that there is no evidence of a change in the long-term trend in fertility. A recent Census study on the relation of age at marriage to size of family indicates that, while fertility has declined among women marrying at all ages, the family size of women marrying young is much larger than that of those marrying at older ages, and they are more resistant to influences favouring very small families. If, as seems to be the case during the war period, women married at younger ages than they otherwise would have done, it may be expected that the completed families of these women will be somewhat larger than if their marriages had been postponed. This factor may tend to stabilise reproduction rates. importance of this trend can be seen from the fact that if the population is not ultimately to decline, about a quarter of all marriages should have four or more children. On the other hand, changes which have not yet made them selves felt, and which will probably have an adverse effect on fertility statistics, are taking place in the Canadian economy in wartime. The chief of these is the greatly intensified movement into the cities, where the birth rate is low, from the rural districts, where it is higher. Recent estimates of the Social Analysis Branch of the Dominion Bureau of Statistics show that this movement has been much greater during the war years than at any previous time. It is of course possible that for time. It is of course possible that farmers who have moved into the city return to the farm when the war is over, but it seems more probable that if Canada continues on the path of rapid industrialisation and more urban ways living, the small family is likely to become living, the small family is likely to become more and more fashionable. more likely that even though continued prosperity may avert any immediate catastrophic decline in births, in the end, the small family will only be entrenched more firmly.

MORTALITY (CIVILIAN)

The following report is for civilian mortality only; deaths from enemy action are not considered. Disregarding the effects of wars and their after math, the past century has seen a decline in the death rate in the countries of the white world. The crude death rate gives the actual mortality per population. But since death rates in infancy and old age are much higher in middle life, differences in the sex and age composition of the population in different communities make the use of the crude death rates unsatisfactory for purposes of comparison. The 'standardised' death rate shows the death for individual years calculated directly from proportions shown in each sex age group at the various censuses.

It is much more difficult to demonstrate any specific effect of the war on civilian mortality than on the marriage and birth rate. The standardised death rate for Canada from the years 1926 - 1942 shows that mortality appeared to be stationary during the worst years of the depression but began to improve in 1938. 1941 was a bad year for epidemics and saw a rise in both the crude and the standardised death rate. The preliminary crude death rate for 1945 and the standardised death rate of 1945 and 1942.

A good index of the level of mortality in a community is afforded by all average expectation of life at birth. In the years 1930-32 that rate for the of Canada was 60.00 years for males, and 62.10 for females. In 1940-42, are was 62.95 years for males and 66.29 years for females, a very considerable improvement for 10 years. Since Quebec was not included in the registration area in 1921, comparable figures are not available for the previous decomposition in death rates in this 10 year period corresponds pretty closely to European experience at the same level of mortality. Improvement was greater