

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

aspect is deterrence, i.e., the counterthreat of retaliation so long as CW stocks remain. This is the aspect, though, that no one wants to discuss in terms of the real world.

The United States has said simply that, if we are attacked with chemical weapons, we must have a variety of response options, including the option to respond in kind so long as we still have some chemical weapons. We earnestly wish that such precautions were unnecessary. But, as the sad developments of the last two weeks show all too clearly, setting a good example is not enough. The United States must ask why many delegations seem more concerned about the United States than about outlaw States that are all too ready to brandish their well-practised CW capabilities in support of aggressive designs.

The United States delegation would like to think that this summer has been one of the last stages before bringing our negotiations to conclusion. We need to be realistic though. What lies ahead is resolution of issues which have confronted and confounded us since 1984. The polemics and procedural challenges we have all witnessed this summer are indications to me that we have reached the inevitable phase in our work when the tough questions are at last on the table.

When we return to these negotiations later this fall and next year, the United States delegation will be ready to roll up its sleeves and grapple with the remaining issues.

We will want to hear then more from our Chinese colleagues about their new challenge inspection proposals. We would like to hear from our Peruvian colleagues about the ideas they have just proposed for protecting the environment. We want to have a real exchange with non-aligned delegations on the interrelationship of routine, ad hoc, and challenge inspections, and we want to explain why we believe a three-part verification system creates the most effective and least confrontational régime possible for building confidence in compliance.

The United States has no hidden agenda. We continue to be committed to concluding a comprehensive and effectively verifiable convention banning chemical weapons. The agreement the United States adheres to, however, will not be a lowest-common-denominator arrangement set forth in ambiguities that paper over real differences. We understand the reluctance, particularly after weeks of negotiating, to accommodate late-coming positions or controversial views. But none of us will let our vital security interests be overridden.

It says something about the artificial, rarified atmosphere of this Conference that we are concluding our work for the session by concentrating so intensely on footnotes and brackets, while in the real world the aggressive use of chemical weapons is boldly and quite credibly threatened. Let us move our work to conclusion in a spirit of compromise, excluding extraneous goals, so that the force of legal obligation and deterrent power of effective verification prevent this from happening again.