

However, apart from the fact that a separate removal of the Pershing IIs from Western Europe now appears likely as part of a US-Soviet agreement limited to INF, there would appear to be no need to link the disposition of forward-deployed submarine forces with that of land-based systems. In view of the preference which the Soviet Union has expressed in the past for limitations on forward maritime deployments, together with the vulnerability of its own coastal areas to attack with little or no warning as mentioned above, an agreement limited to maritime "stand-off zones" should prove equally attractive to both sides.

In principle, of course, each side should recognize the stake it has in not jeopardizing the survivability of its adversary's C<sup>3</sup>I system. As William Perry puts it, "The Soviets should realize that close-in basing of their SLBMs poses as much of a threat to them as to the United States; if close-in basing causes us to devise a rapid response system, it increases the probability of falsely launching on warning. This is a problem that is of mutual concern to both countries and that both sides should work to resolve."<sup>152</sup>

One important difference, however, is that the United States feels most vulnerable along its east and west coasts, while the Soviet Union — given the dictates of geography — would be more concerned about its Arctic areas. Yet northern "stand-off zones" of 2,500 kilometers in width would encompass the whole of the Arctic Ocean, and be much more difficult to monitor than east or west coast zones. On the other hand, because Soviet installations are for the most part located further inland than their American counterparts, the width of the zone in the Arctic could be appreciably less than that of those covering the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. And an Arctic zone would still be of value to the United States and its NATO allies in providing additional warning time for those of their installations (especially early-warning radars) that are located in the Arctic.

Because of the possible verification difficulties in distinguishing between types of unidentified submarines and the above-mentioned

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152. Perry, *op. cit.* note 139, p. 1033.